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RECONCEPTUALIZING FEDERAL COURTS IN THE WAR ON 
TERROR 
JONATHAN HAFETZ* 
INTRODUCTION 
Representing Justice: Invention, Controversy, and Rights in City-States 
and Democratic Courtrooms, Professors Judith Resnik and Dennis Curtis’s 
tour de force of the iconography of justice and courts, draws parallels between 
the U.S. detention center at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, and broader trends in 
adjudication.1  Guantánamo, Resnik and Curtis argue, may be aberrational in 
the extremity of its approach to detention and interrogation.2  But, they explain, 
it also reflects a larger, trans-substantive shift away from public dispute 
resolution, a growing reliance on administrative and other nonjudicial forms of 
decisionmaking, a loosening of procedural safeguards, and a decline of judicial 
independence.3  “One might well think of Guantánamo as isolated in both the 
literal and legal senses,” Resnik and Curtis write.4  “But unfortunately, some of 
its procedures are not as foreign to contemporary decisionmaking as one might 
wish.”5 
Resnik has elsewhere explored the idea of Guantánamo as exemplifying 
continuity rather than change.  In her article Detention, the War on Terror, and 
the Federal Courts, Resnik identifies similarities between Guantánamo and the 
United States’ treatment of criminal defendants, immigrants, and convicted 
prisoners during the past three decades.6  She emphasizes, for example, how 
these prisoners have faced increasingly harsh forms of confinement and limited 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law.  I would like to thank Judith 
Resnik and the other participants of the 2011 Richard J. Childress Memorial Lecture for 
insightful comments and criticisms.  I would also like to thank Sarah Pohlman and the editorial 
staff of the Saint Louis University Law Journal.  All errors are mine alone. 
 1. JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE: INVENTION, 
CONTROVERSY, AND RIGHTS IN CITY-STATES AND DEMOCRATIC COURTROOMS 328–34 (2011). 
 2. Id. at 327, 334. 
 3. Id. at 334–37. 
 4. Id. at 334. 
 5. Id. at 334–35. 
 6. Judith Resnik, Detention, the War on Terror, and the Federal Courts, 110 COLUM. L. 
REV. 579, 634–63 (2010). 
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access to courts that mirror the treatment of Guantánamo detainees.7  Other 
scholars have similarly drawn parallels between America’s treatment of 
prisoners in the “war on crime” and the “war on terror.”8  Viewed from this 
perspective, Guantánamo represents more of a pronounced expression of broad 
trends in the U.S. legal system than a radical departure from them.  And the 
example that Guantánamo offers of the devolution of adjudicatory processes 
from Article III courts to specialized tribunals is one that reverberates beyond 
the realm of national security detentions. 
Representing Justice thus provides a valuable lens through which to 
examine the impact of changes in U.S. law and policy after 9/11—changes that 
reflect the shifting role of courts in democracies over time.  But it also prompts 
consideration of how the United States’ approach to terrorism has affected our 
understanding of the way that courts function, are perceived, and reflect social 
values. 
U.S. detentions at Guantánamo, as Resnik and Curtis note, rely on quasi-
administrative structures like Combatant Status Review Tribunals (“CSRTs”) 
and military commissions in lieu of federal courts.9  Yet, notwithstanding the 
creation of such new, non-Article III forms of adjudication, federal courts will 
continue to serve as the forum for at least some terrorism prosecutions, 
including of individuals suspected of supporting al Qaeda and affiliated 
groups.  Military tribunals have not supplanted federal courts but rather 
emerged as an alternative to them.  Once the exclusive mechanism for the 
long-term incapacitation of terrorism suspects, federal courts have become one 
choice on a growing menu of detention options.10 
The creation of these alternative detention options has affected how federal 
courts are represented and perceived.  Proponents of using federal courts 
increasingly emphasize their toughness as a way of demonstrating their 
continued viability as a forum for terrorism prosecutions in light of forum 
competition from military commissions.11  Even liberal advocacy groups have 
 
 7. Id. at 634–35. 
 8. See, e.g., James Forman, Jr., Exporting Harshness: How the War on Crime Helped Make 
the War on Terror Possible, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 331 (2009) (comparing the wars 
on terror and crime and concluding that “in some important ways, 9/11 did not change 
everything”); see also Denny LeBoeuf, From the Big Easy to the Big Lie, in THE GUANTÁNAMO 
LAWYERS: INSIDE A PRISON OUTSIDE THE LAW 193–200 (Mark P. Denbeaux & Jonathan Hafetz 
eds., 2009) (comparing the experience of representing capital defendants in Louisiana to that of 
representing Guantánamo detainees before military commissions). 
 9. RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 1, at 327–28. 
 10. See, e.g., Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of 
Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1080–81 (2008); Aziz Z. Huq, 
Forum Choice for Terrorism Suspects, 61 DUKE L.J. 1415, 1427–28 (2012). 
 11. Joshua T. Bell, Trying Al Qaeda: Bringing Terrorists to Justice, PERSP. ON TERRORISM, 
Oct. 2010, at 73, 77–78, http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/115/234. 
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shown an increasing tendency to justify federal courts based on their ability to 
deliver convictions rather than to protect individual rights or deal even-
handedly with the accused.12 
At the same time, federal courts are criticized for risking disclosure of 
classified or other sensitive information, infringing on executive prerogatives, 
and undermining military and intelligence operations.13  These criticisms have 
not only helped legitimize military alternatives to federal criminal prosecution 
for the long-term incapacitation of terrorism suspects; they also have supplied 
justifications for denying civil litigants—particularly, victims of torture, 
arbitrary detention, and other forms of mistreatment—a judicial remedy and 
for dismissing legal challenges to controversial government programs under 
various justiciability doctrines. 
This Article will explore the ways in which Guantánamo and the war on 
terror more generally have altered the perception and operation of federal 
courts. 
Part I describes the growth after 9/11 of a new type of military detention 
system that provides an alternative to Article III-court prosecutions of 
terrorism suspects.  Part II examines how this parallel military detention 
system has affected the way federal courts are defined and represented as a 
forum for terrorism prosecutions.  Part III looks at federal courts from the 
perspective of their role in providing a forum for plaintiffs seeking redress for 
torture, unlawful detention, and related abuses.  It describes how many of the 
same reasons cited in opposition of federal criminal prosecution of terrorism 
suspects are invoked—often by federal judges themselves—to prevent federal 
court adjudication of civil damages litigation arising out of government 
misconduct during counterterrorism operations.  Part IV examines federal 
courts from another vantage point, describing their engagement with the new, 
post-9/11 military detention system through the exercise of habeas corpus 
 
 12. See, e.g., RICHARD B. ZABEL & JAMES J. BENJAMIN, JR., HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, IN 
PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING TERRORISM CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS, 2009 UPDATE 
AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, at ii (2009); ACLU Urges Obama Administration to Stand by 
Decision to Try 9/11 Suspects in Federal Criminal Courts, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Mar. 
19, 2010), http://www.aclu.org/national-security/aclu-urges-obama-administration-stand-deci 
sion-try-911-suspects-federal-criminal-c (“Since 9/11, there have been over 300 terrorism-related 
convictions in federal court.  The military commissions have completed only three terrorism-
related cases, with two of the three convicted defendants having served relatively short sentences 
they have already completed. . . .  Attorney General Holder’s decision to use federal criminal 
courts was the right decision for national security and the right decision for the rule of law.”); 
Ghailani Trial Underscores Federal Courts’ Ability To Prosecute Terrorism Suspects, Says 
ACLU, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.aclu.org/national-security/ghaila 
ni-trial-underscores-federal-courts-ability-prosecute-terrorism-suspects-say; see also 157 CONG. 
REC. S6752 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 2011) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy). 
 13. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Prosecuting Suspected Terrorists: The Role of Civilian 
Courts, ADVANCE, Fall 2008, at 63, 63. 
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jurisdiction.  Here, federal courts have performed two, inter-related functions: 
first, articulating general rules and principles to govern military detention and 
trial, and second, acting as quasi national security courts by reviewing the 
validity of individual prisoners’ military confinement.  While federal courts 
have imposed some constraints on the government’s ability to hold terrorism 
suspects outside the criminal justice system, they have largely accommodated 
the new forms of military detention that emerged after 9/11 under the rubric of 
the war on terrorism and have shown considerable deference to the 
government’s allegations in individual cases. 
I.  MILITARY DETENTION AND THE OPTIONALITY OF FEDERAL COURT 
PROSECUTION 
Before 9/11, criminal prosecution represented the exclusive method in the 
United States for the long-term incapacitation of terrorism suspects.14  This 
exclusivity resulted from the government’s treatment of terrorism as a law 
enforcement matter.  While the United States periodically engaged in military 
strikes as part of overseas counterterrorism operations, it maintained a civilian-
law framework for the treatment of terrorism suspects.15  The United States 
could, where appropriate, deport a suspect under immigration law16 or, if 
seized abroad, render that suspect to another country.17  But if the government 
desired a suspect’s long-term incarceration, its only option was to prosecute 
and convict him in federal court.18 
After 9/11, the United States has created a new legal framework for 
detaining terrorism suspects outside the criminal justice system.  Relying on 
 
 14. Although alien terrorism suspects also could be incapacitated under federal immigration 
law, this typically constituted short-term detention, pending the alien’s removal from the United 
States.  See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §§ 411–12, 
115 Stat. 272, 345–52 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1189, 1226a (2006)) (supplying terrorism-
related definitions and requiring the detention of suspected terrorists); see also Zadvydas v. 
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699–700 (2001) (explaining the purposes of immigration removal and 
asserting that “if removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the court should hold continued detention 
unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute”). 
 15. Note, Responding to Terrorism: Crime, Punishment, and War, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1217, 
1217–21 (2002). 
 16. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(B) (2006). 
 17. In the mid-1990s, the United States started to send suspected terrorists seized abroad to 
foreign countries for detention, as opposed to bringing them to the United States to face trial 
there.  See JONATHAN HAFETZ, HABEAS CORPUS AFTER 9/11: CONFRONTING AMERICA’S NEW 
GLOBAL DETENTION SYSTEM 52 (2011); see also Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Rendered 
Meaningless: Extraordinary Rendition and the Rule of Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1333, 1336–
37 (2007) (noting the development of the prior use of “renditions to justice” during the 1980s to 
bring suspects captured abroad to the United States for trial). 
 18. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
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both the 2001 congressional Authorization for Use of Military Force 
(“AUMF”)19 and his inherent commander-in-chief power, President Bush 
claimed the authority to treat certain terrorism suspects as “enemy combatants” 
in a global “war on terrorism.”20  Detainees, the Bush Administration asserted, 
could be held as enemy combatants for the duration of the conflict or, where 
appropriate, tried by military commission for war crimes.21  While the 
Administration resisted definitional clarity on the scope of its detention 
authority, it claimed that this authority was without geographic limitation and 
included members and supporters of al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated 
forces, even if they did not directly participate in hostilities.22  It further 
asserted that those held as enemy combatants had no right to access U.S. courts 
if they were held outside the sovereign United States23 and had de minimis 
judicial review if they were detained inside the country.24 
This war on terrorism framework underlay the detention without charge of 
hundreds of individuals at Guantánamo, Bagram, and CIA-run “black sites” as 
well as the military detention of three people inside the United States.25  It also 
supplied the rationale for transferring prisoners between detention facilities as 
well as rendering prisoners to foreign countries for torture and other abusive 
interrogation methods through the practice known as “extraordinary 
rendition.”26 
This alternative system, however, was never intended to supplant the 
federal criminal justice system.  Federal criminal prosecutions of terrorism 
suspects continued throughout the Bush Administration.27  There was, 
moreover, significant overlap between the category of individuals who could 
be subjected to war-on-terrorism confinement (whether through indefinite 
enemy combatant detention or military commission prosecution), on the one 
hand, or federal criminal indictment, on the other.  For example, a person who 
provided support to al Qaeda or assisted al Qaeda in plotting a terrorist attack 
 
 19. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) 
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006)). 
 20.  HAFETZ, supra note 17, at 12, 18. 
 21. See id. at 16, 18. 
 22. Id. at 119. 
 23. Id. at 29–30. 
 24. See id. at 77. 
 25. HAFETZ, supra note 17, at 31, 48–49, 58, 76–77. 
 26. Id. at 52–53.  Although the United States had begun rendering terrorism suspects to 
foreign governments during the mid-1990s, after 9/11, the practice expanded significantly, 
operated with fewer internal checks, and was no longer tied to the existence of legal proceedings 
against the suspect in the receiving country.  Id. 
 27. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY2009 BUDGET AND PERFORMANCE SUMMARY pt. 1, at 1, 4 
(2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2009summary/pdf/fy2009-bud-sum.pdf (noting 
319 terrorism-related or anti-terrorism-case convictions or guilty pleas between September 11, 
2001 and 2009). 
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could be subject to either civilian or military confinement.  Indeed, in some 
cases, individuals were subjected to both forms of confinement.28  Unlike in 
prior armed conflicts, where a person’s legal status as a combatant (i.e., a 
prisoner of war) precluded his criminal prosecution except for war crimes, war 
on terrorism detainees have no such protection from prosecution.29  The same 
individual can be prosecuted in federal court for providing material support to 
al Qaeda if the government elects the law enforcement model or be held 
indefinitely in military custody as a member of al Qaeda if the government 
opts instead for the law-of-war paradigm.30  That person, moreover, may also 
be prosecuted in a military commission for providing material support to al 
Qaeda.31 
Jurisdictional overlap thus expanded the government’s options for holding 
individuals based on a variety of terrorism-related conduct.  It also offered 
greater latitude to conduct interrogations and an escape from procedural 
protections of the civilian criminal justice system, including access to counsel 
and a prompt judicial hearing—protections that were denied to war-on-
terrorism detainees for years.32 
Despite his post-inaugural order to close the U.S. detention center at 
Guantánamo Bay,33 President Obama has maintained the underlying legal 
framework that permits the military detention and prosecution of terrorism 
suspects, pursuing a path of reform and legalization rather than returning to the 
pre-9/11 exclusivity model of federal criminal prosecution.34  Early in his 
administration, Obama stressed the need for flexibility and for maximizing the 
government’s available counterterrorism tools.35  He stated that “whenever 
feasible,” the Administration would seek to prosecute terrorism suspects in 
 
 28. Ali al-Marri, for example, was originally indicted in federal court, declared an enemy 
combatant before his federal criminal trial, and then finally returned to the civilian system to face 
different criminal charges after nearly six years of military detention.  See al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 
534 F.3d 213, 217 (4th Cir. 2008) (Motz, J., concurring in part) (summarizing the underlying 
facts), vacated, Al-Marri v. Spagone, 555 U.S. 1220 (2009). 
 29. See HAFETZ, supra note 17, at 184–85. 
 30. As noted above, under a law-of-war model, the government could either hold a prisoner 
indefinitely without charge as an enemy combatant or, where appropriate, prosecute that prisoner 
for the commission of war crimes.  See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text. 
 31. 10 U.S.C. § 950t(25) (Supp. III 2010). 
 32. See HAFETZ, supra note 17, at 75, 236. 
 33. Exec. Order No. 13,492 § 3, 3 C.F.R. 203, 205 (2010). 
 34. See generally HAFETZ, supra note 17, at 238–52 (surveying the Obama Administration’s 
detention policy, which “stressed the importance of the criminal justice system” in handling 
terrorism cases, yet maintained the military commissions system and “continued to hold some 
Guantánamo detainees indefinitely”). 
 35. See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on National Security (May 21, 
2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-On-
National-Security-5-21-09/. 
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federal court.36  But he also endorsed prosecution in reformed military 
commissions that provide greater protections to the accused and make 
commissions a “more credible and effective means of administering justice” 
than they were previously.37  Obama further accepted the legitimacy of holding 
some individuals indefinitely in law-of-war detention—that is, without trial in 
any forum—when prosecution was not possible because, for example, the 
government’s evidence was tainted or insufficient to support a conviction.38  
The Administration subsequently backed legislative reforms to military 
commissions and provided a more nuanced statement of the President’s 
detention authority under the AUMF, while eschewing claims of inherent 
executive detention power under the Constitution’s Commander-in-Chief 
Clause.39  Additionally, Obama halted two of the most controversial practices 
associated with war-on-terrorism detentions, banning the use of “enhanced 
interrogation techniques”40 and ordering the closure of any remaining secret 
CIA “black sites.”41  These changes, along with Obama’s stated commitment 
to a rights-respecting national security policy,42 helped diffuse criticism of 
post-9/11 military detentions and legitimize the long-term incarceration of 
terrorism suspects outside the criminal justice system. 
While the executive branch has sought to maximize its options for 
detaining terrorism suspects,43 Congress has sought to limit the President’s 
ability to prosecute terrorism suspects in federal court, even where the 
President determines that civilian court prosecution best serves the national 
interest.  Congress has repeatedly attached provisions to military 
appropriations legislation that prohibit the President from using any Defense 
Department funds to transfer Guantánamo detainees to the United States for 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. The Administration, for example, replaced the label “enemy combatant” with 
“unprivileged enemy belligerent,” relied expressly on the law of war, and required that a 
prisoner’s support for al Qaeda, the Taliban, or an associated group be “substantial” to justify his 
detention under the AUMF.  See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. 
L. No. 111-84, § 1802, 123 Stat. 2190, 2574–75 (2009) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 948a 
(Supp. III 2010)); Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority 
Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., Misc. No. 
08-442 (TFH) (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2009) (discussing the United States’ detention power of 
Guantánamo detainees under the AUMF in light of law-of-war principles and emphasizing the 
President’s intention to refine detention policies). 
 40. Exec. Order No. 13,491 § 3(b), 3 C.F.R. 199, 200–01 (2010) (confining the U.S. 
government to the techniques set forth in the Army Field Manual). 
 41. Id. § 4(a). 
 42. See id. §§ 3–4; Exec. Order No. 13,492, supra note 33. 
 43. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
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any purpose, including for criminal prosecution in federal court.44  These 
Article III-transfer bans have halted the further civilian court prosecution of 
any Guantánamo detainees,45 including the planned prosecution of alleged 9/11 
mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (“KSM”) and four co-conspirators in 
federal court in New York.46  Additionally, Congress has imposed restrictions 
on the President’s ability to transfer Guantánamo detainees to other countries, 
even where the President has determined that there is no basis or reason for the 
United States to continue to hold them.47  Its restrictions have further 
embedded the practice of indefinite detention at Guantánamo. 
Recent legislation continues this pattern.  The National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (“2012 NDAA”) expressly codifies the 
President’s authority to detain indefinitely individuals who were part of or who 
substantially supported al Qaeda, the Taliban, or an associated force.48  The 
2012 NDAA also requires the military detention of certain terrorism suspects.49  
While the act allows the President to waive this requirement, it creates for the 
first time a default presumption of military custody over terrorism suspects.50  
The 2012 NDAA thus not only helps institutionalize indefinite military 
detention as an alternative to federal criminal prosecution but also suggests 
how military detention threatens to expand in new directions. 
II.  TERRORISM AND THE CHANGING PERCEPTION OF FEDERAL COURTS 
Federal courts must now operate in the shadow of the alternative military 
detention system that has emerged as part of the war on terrorism.  That 
system, in turn, has affected how federal courts are defined and perceived.  
One effect has been to change the metric of success for federal courts, placing 
emphasis on their ability to produce convictions and impose long sentences 
 
 44. E.g., Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No. 
111-383, § 1032, 124 Stat. 4137, 4351 (2011). 
 45. See Charlie Savage, In a Reversal, Military Trials for 9/11 Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 
2011, at A1 (noting “stiffening Congressional resistance to bringing Guantánamo detainees into 
the United States” prior to trying a former Guantánamo detainee in federal court).  To date, only 
one former Guantánamo detainee, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, has been prosecuted in federal court.  
See Benjamin Weiser, U.S. Jury Acquits Former Detainee of Most Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
18, 2010, at A1. 
 46. See Savage, supra note 45. 
 47. Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 § 1033. 
 48. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No 112-81, § 1021, 
125 Stat. 1298, 1562 (2011). 
 49. Id. at § 1022 (creating a presumption of military custody for covered terrorism suspects).  
The act excludes U.S. citizens from mandatory military detention.  Id. at § 1022(b)(1). 
 50. Id. at § 1022(a).  Congress had considered an even stronger mandatory detention 
provision, which would have required a waiver from the Secretary of Defense.  National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, S. 1867, 112th Cong. §§ 1031–32 (as passed by Senate, 
Dec. 1, 2011). 
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and minimizing other values, such as an institutional commitment to due 
process and other constitutional norms.51  In an era where military detention 
and prosecution remain options, the virtues of Article III-court prosecutions 
rest increasingly on their toughness, rather than their fairness. 
The overlap between federal criminal prosecution and military 
confinement—whether through law-of-war detention or military commission 
prosecution—has resulted in competition among law enforcement, military, 
and intelligence agencies engaged in fighting terrorism.  Given ongoing media 
focus on U.S. counterterrorism efforts,52 that competition can be intense.  The 
decision whether to prosecute terrorism suspects in federal court or hold them 
in some form of military confinement has important legal, political, and inter-
agency ramifications.  It is also laden with symbolic importance, pitting 
competing visions of U.S. counterterrorism policy against one another. 
Forum competition has surfaced prominently in the debate over the fate of 
the remaining Guantánamo detainees.  Obama’s post-inaugural executive order 
directing the closure of the Guantánamo detention center created an inter-
agency task force to review the status of the remaining 240 detainees there and 
to provide recommendations for their proper disposition.53  One year later, the 
task force issued its report, dividing the detainees into three broad categories: 
those who would be prosecuted, those who would be subjected to continued 
law-of-war detention, and those who would be transferred to a third country. 54  
According to the report, thirty-six detainees had been referred for prosecution, 
either in a federal court or a military commission.55  The prosecution category 
included KSM and four other 9/11 co-conspirators who, as Attorney General 
Eric Holder had previously announced, would be charged in federal district 
court in New York.56  Another detainee, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, had already 
 
 51. See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text; see also Chesney & Goldsmith, supra 
note 10, at 1081 (“[T]he criminal justice system has diminished some traditional procedural 
safeguards in terrorism trials and has quietly established the capacity for convicting terrorists 
based on criteria that come close to associational status.”). 
 52. See, e.g., Jane Mayer, The Trial: Eric Holder and the Battle over Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed, NEW YORKER, Feb. 15–22, 2010, at 52; Savage, supra note 45; Weiser, supra note 
45. 
 53. Exec. Order No. 13,492, supra note 33, § 4. 
 54. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE ET AL., FINAL REPORT: GUANTANAMO REVIEW TASK FORCE 9–
10 (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/guantanamo-review-final-report.pdf 
[hereinafter FINAL REPORT]. 
 55. Id. (noting that forty-four cases had initially been referred for prosecution and that thirty-
six cases remained the subject of active referrals).  The report also specified that 126 detainees 
had been approved for transfer; forty-eight detainees had been approved for continued detention 
under the AUMF; and thirty detainees from Yemen had been approved for “conditional” 
detention based on security conditions in Yemen.  Id. 
 56. See Charlie Savage, U.S. To Try Avowed 9/11 Mastermind Before Civilian Court in New 
York, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2009, at A1. 
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been transferred from Guantánamo to the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York for prosecution there based on his alleged involvement in 
the 1998 Embassy bombings in East Africa.57  The task force report did not 
indicate how many of the remaining detainees in the prosecution category 
would be charged in federal court, as opposed to a military commission, 
although Holder had also previously announced that six individuals connected 
with the 2000 terrorist attack on the Navy destroyer Cole in Yemen would be 
prosecuted in military commissions.58 
The decision to prosecute even a few Guantánamo detainees in federal 
court ignited a political backlash, with opposition crystallizing over the Justice 
Department’s plan to try KSM in New York.59  Lawmakers, political-advocacy 
groups, and conservative pundits all attacked Holder’s decision.60  According 
to Andrew McCarthy, a former terrorism prosecutor and outspoken critic of 
using federal courts to prosecute terrorism suspects, Holder failed to recognize 
that in wartime the rule of law means using military commissions and not 
“wrap[ping] our enemies in our Bill of Rights.”61  Opposition to KSM’s 
prosecution gained momentum following the attempted 2009 Christmas Day 
bombing by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab of a Northwest Airlines plane bound 
for Detroit.62  Critics charged that Abdulmutallab should be prosecuted before 
a military commission and not treated as a criminal suspect, as Obama’s 
Justice Department had done.63  “Why in God’s name would you stop 
questioning a terrorist,” remarked former New York City mayor Rudolph 
Giuliani in response to reports that Abdulmutallab had ceased cooperating after 
invoking his Miranda rights during interrogations after his arrest.64  Senator 
Lamar Alexander told FOX News that Holder should resign for failing to 
distinguish “terrorists who are flying into Detroit, blowing up planes, and 
American citizens who are committing a crime.”65 
Before long, New York’s political leaders came out against prosecuting 
KSM in New York, citing costs, security concerns, and local opposition.66  
Congress, in turn, passed legislation barring the use of any military funds to 
transfer Guantánamo detainees to the United States for any purpose, including 
 
 57. Peter Finn, Guantanamo Bay Detainee Brought to U.S. for Trial, WASH. POST, June 10, 
2009, at A1. 
 58. Savage, supra note 56. 
 59. Id.; Mayer, supra note 52, at 52–53. 
 60. Mayer, supra note 52, at 52–53. 
 61. Id. at 52. 
 62. Id. at 52–53. 
 63. See id. 
 64. Id. at 53. 
 65. Mayer, supra note 52, at 54. 
 66. Id. at 53. 
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for criminal trial.67  Faced with legal obstacles and mounting political pressure, 
the Obama Administration reversed its decision to prosecute KSM and the 9/11 
co-conspirators in federal court, stating that it would instead try the men in a 
military commission.68  To date, Ghailani remains the only Guantánamo 
detainee prosecuted in a U.S. federal court, and no other civilian court 
prosecutions of Guantánamo detainees are expected.69 
Each new arrest of a terrorism suspect, moreover, reignites the debate over 
federal criminal prosecutions and sparks calls for military jurisdiction.  When, 
for example, Faisal Shahzad, a naturalized American citizen, was arrested in 
May 2010 for attempting to detonate a car bomb near New York City’s Times 
Square, legislation was introduced in Congress that would have authorized the 
State Department to strip American citizens suspected of supporting al Qaeda 
and other terrorist groups of their citizenship, thereby permitting their 
prosecution by military commission (since current law prohibits the 
prosecution of American citizens by commission).70  The federal indictment of 
Somali terrorism suspect Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame the following year—
after Warsame’s two-month detention on a U.S. ship in the Gulf of Aden—
prompted attacks against the Obama Administration for failing to prosecute 
Warsame before a military commission.71  Bringing Warsame to trial in the 
United States rather than sending him to Guantánamo, wrote Senators Joseph I. 
Lieberman and Kelly Ayotte, undermined the government’s ability to obtain 
intelligence, risked the disclosure of classified or other sensitive information, 
and endangered the country’s security.72  In this narrative, military 
commissions are associated with toughness and security, while federal courts 
are portrayed as weak, incapable of handling classified or other sensitive 
information, and overly protective of a defendant’s rights.73 
Competition from military tribunals has placed pressure on federal courts 
to demonstrate their ability to handle terrorism cases.  Often, this pressure has 
resulted in government officials and non-government organizations describing 
 
 67. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 
1032, 124 Stat. 4137, 4351 (2011). 
 68. Savage, supra note 45. 
 69. Ghailani Verdict Underlines Need for Fair Trials for All Guantánamo Detainees, 
AMNESTY INT’L (Nov. 18, 2010), http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/ghailani-verdict-
underlines-need-fair-trials-all-guantánamo-detainees-2010-11-18 (“Ghailani, 36, is the first and 
only Guantánamo detainee to be transferred to the US mainland for prosecution in a US civilian 
court.”). 
 70. Terrorist Expatriation Act, S. 3327, 111th Cong. § 2 (2010); Charlie Savage & Carl 
Hulse, Bill Targets Citizenship of Terrorists’ Allies, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2010, at A12. 
 71. See Charlie Savage & Eric Schmitt, U.S. to Prosecute a Somali Suspect in Civilian 
Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2011, at A1. 
 72. Joseph I. Lieberman & Kelly Ayotte, Op-Ed., Why We Still Need Guantanamo, WASH. 
POST, July 22, 2011, at A17. 
 73. Id. 
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how effective federal courts are in obtaining convictions and negating the 
charge that federal prosecutions sacrifice security in the name of due process 
and fairness.74 
In defending his initial decision to prosecute the 9/11 conspirators in 
federal court rather than in a military commission, for example, Holder cited 
federal courts’ success in convicting terrorism suspects in the past, their ability 
to handle classified material, and their power to impose the severest sanctions, 
including death.75  Not surprisingly, Holder did not mention the rights afforded 
all defendants, including those accused of the gravest crimes.76  Holder echoed 
similar themes in his statement after the decision to prosecute the 9/11 
conspirators in federal court was ultimately reversed.77  Holder explained that 
he had chosen a federal forum because it could “achieve swift and sure justice 
most effectively for the victims of [the 9/11 attacks] and their family 
members.”78  He criticized congressional restrictions on using federal courts to 
prosecute Guantánamo detainees because the restrictions undermined 
America’s counterterrorism efforts and threatened its security by taking “one 
of the nation’s most tested counterterrorism tools off the table” and tying the 
Administration’s “hands in a way that could have serious ramifications.”79  
While Holder emphasized that federal courts have provided an “unparalleled 
instrument for bringing terrorists to justice,” he once again declined to defend 
federal courts based on the protections they offer the accused or the 
mechanisms they provide to ensure a fair trial.80 
Others have defended federal courts on similar grounds.  Former judges, 
prosecutors, and other government officials have filed amicus curiae briefs in 
post-9/11 cases that detail the success of federal courts in convicting terrorism 
suspects.81  Bar associations have made similar points.82  Even liberal 
 
 74. See supra notes 11–12, 51 and accompanying text. 
 75. See Mayer, supra note 52, at 54. 
 76. See id. 
 77. See Press Release, Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Att’y Gen., Statement of the Attorney 
General on the Prosecution of the 9/11 Conspirators (Apr. 4, 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2011/ag-speech-110404.html. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of Former Federal Judges & Former Senior Justice 
Department Officials in Support of Petitioner at 6, Al-Marri v. Spagone, 555 U.S. 1220 (2009) 
(No. 08-368), 2009 WL 230957 at *6 (emphasizing the federal courts’ success in obtaining 
convictions in terrorism cases, history of imposing lengthy sentences, and ability to handle 
classified and other sensitive information). 
 82. See Letter from Samuel W. Seymor, President, N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n, to Hon. Harry R. 
Reid, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate,  & Hon. Mitch McConnell, Minority Leader, U.S. Senate 1–2 
(Mar. 21, 2011), available at http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20072081-Letterto 
CongressregardingSections1112and1113ofthe2011Full-YearContinuingAppropriationsAct.pdf 
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advocacy groups have emphasized the toughness of federal courts in 
prosecuting terrorism suspects.  In a full-page advertisement in the New York 
Times, for example, the American Civil Liberties Union stressed the federal 
court system’s success in handling terrorism cases, along with noting the due 
process protections it affords the accused.83  Meanwhile, military commissions 
have themselves sought to appropriate notions of fairness and justice 
traditionally associated with federal courts to enhance their legitimacy as a 
forum for terrorism prosecutions.84 
Defenses of federal prosecutions thus rest increasingly on their efficacy in 
securing convictions and promoting national security.  The protections 
afforded criminal suspects, by contrast, have become a liability that federal 
courts must overcome rather than an independent virtue to be emphasized.  To 
the extent rights are mentioned at all, they are typically referenced in terms of 
their ability to provide legitimacy to the process and thus support for the 
conviction, rather than as safeguards of the accused.85 
The emphasis on prosecutorial prowess and success is understandable.  In 
light of the highly charged political climate surrounding terrorism, stressing 
federal courts’ ability to prosecute terrorism cases can help deflect arguments 
for military commissions or indefinite detention.  Framing the argument for a 
civilian criminal trial of the 9/11 conspirators in terms of the rights it affords 
defendants might have been counter-productive, in addition to exacting a 
heavy political price on those who voiced it.  Highlighting federal courts’ 
toughness also facilitates seemingly unlikely alliances—for example, between 
liberal advocacy groups and law enforcement officials—who may oppose the 
use of military tribunals for different reasons. 
Equating the validity of federal courts with their ability to obtain 
convictions does, however, have costs.  It contributes to a larger narrative in 
which any result except a guilty verdict represents a failure of the system.  In 
other words, the potential for acquittal, when the metric is toughness and not 
 
(emphasizing the ability of federal courts to obtain convictions in opposing a proposed expansion 
of military commissions and military detention authority).  Disclosure: the author is a member of 
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 83. See Stephanie Woodrow, ACLU Calls on Obama to Support Holder on Civilian Trials, 
MAIN JUST. (Mar. 8. 2010), http://www.mainjustice.com/2010/03/08/aclu-calls-on-obama-to-sup 
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 84. The website for the military commissions, for example, describes the commissions’ 
mission as “provid[ing] fair and transparent trials of those persons subject to trial by Military 
Commissions while protecting national security interests.”  See OFF. MIL. COMMISSIONS, 
http://www.mc.mil/HOME.aspx (last visited Mar. 15, 2012). 
 85. See, e.g., Letter from Samuel W. Seymor, supra note 82, at 2 (describing the 
effectiveness of federal courts in handling terrorism cases while still preserving due process 
protections); Woodrow, supra note 83 (emphasizing the ability of federal courts to handle 
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fairness, becomes a politically and socially unacceptable outcome that 
undermines the case for federal courts.  Indeed, the outcome need not even be 
an outright acquittal. 
The Ghailani case86 illustrates this problem.  In June 2009, after nearly five 
years of enemy combatant detention—first at a secret CIA “black site” and 
then at Guantánamo—Ghailani was transferred to the United States for federal 
criminal prosecution.87  Ghailani was indicted on more than 280 counts of 
murder and conspiracy for his role in the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in East 
Africa that killed 224 people and injured thousands.88  As the first—and still 
only—criminal prosecution of a former Guantánamo detainee,89 the Ghailani 
trial was laden with symbolism, a “test case” for the viability of federal 
prosecutions of former Guantánamo detainees and others held as enemy 
combatants.  After five days of deliberation, the jury returned a verdict 
convicting Ghailani on a single count of conspiracy to destroy government 
property and buildings and acquitting him of all other charges.90  Critics of 
civilian court prosecutions seized on the verdict as an example of the risks 
federal trials pose.  Representative Peter King of New York (Republican), for 
example, called the verdict “a tragic wake-up call to the Obama 
[A]dministration to immediately abandon its ill-advised plan to try 
Guantánamo terrorists” in federal civilian courts and an example of why the 
United States “must treat [the detainees] as wartime enemies and try them in 
military commissions at Guantánamo.”91  Senator Mitch McConnell of 
Kentucky (Republican) questioned why the United States would “even take the 
chance” of trying Ghailani in a civilian court, where he might be acquitted.92  
The Justice Department responded that the conviction showed the federal court 
system worked because Ghailani was convicted and would receive a lengthy 
sentence, despite the complications his case posed—complications, it noted, 
that were the result of Ghailani’s prior mistreatment in secret CIA detention.93  
 
 86. United States v. Ghailani, 761 F. Supp. 2d 167 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 87. Weiser, supra note 45. 
 88. See Office of Pub. Affairs, Ahmed Ghailani Transferred from Guantanamo Bay to New 
York for Prosecution on Terror Charges, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (June 9, 2009), http://www.jus 
tice.gov/opa/pr/2009/June/09-ag-563.html; see also Weiser, supra note 45. 
 89. Weiser, supra note 45; Ghailani Verdict Underlines Need for Fair Trials for All 
Guantánamo Detainees, supra note 69. 
 90. Weiser, supra note 45. 
 91. Charlie Savage, Ghailani Verdict Reignites Debate Over the Proper Court for Terrorism 
Trials, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2010, at A18. 
 92. See Joseph Margulies, Deviance, Risk, and Law: Reflections on the Demand for the 
Preventive Detention of Suspected Terrorists, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 729, 774 (2011) 
(quoting Sen. McConnell’s statement). 
 93. See Peter Finn, Embassy Bomber Receives Life Sentence, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 2011, at 
A2; Weiser, supra note 45. 
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(Ghailani ultimately received a life sentence).94  Some journalists and 
advocates, to be sure, pointed out that the success of federal courts should be 
measured in terms of their ability to provide fair trials, which, by necessity, 
must include the possibility of acquittal.95  But it was the perception of federal 
courts as posing an unacceptable risk of acquittal that dominated the public 
discourse. 
Even the district judge who presided over Ghailani’s case sought to dispel 
any concerns that a federal trial could result in Ghailani’s release.  Before trial, 
District Judge Lewis A. Kaplan had barred a key government witness from 
testifying on the ground that admission of the testimony would violate 
Ghailani’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination because the 
government had obtained the witness’s testimony through its coercive 
interrogation of Ghailani in secret CIA detention.96  In his order suppressing 
the witness’s statements, Kaplan emphasized the need to preserve the integrity 
of the federal courts by upholding constitutional protections.97  “[T]he 
Constitution is the rock upon which our nation rests,” he explained.  “We must 
follow it not only when it is convenient, but when fear and danger beckon in a 
different direction.”98  Yet, Kaplan also sought to assuage any fear that his 
ruling could result in the defendant’s release: even if Ghailani were acquitted 
at trial, he said, the United States could still “probably” detain him as an 
enemy combatant.99 
Courts, Resnik and Curtis observe in Representing Justice, have long 
provided a way for the government “to legitimate its own use of force against 
the disobedient by demonstrating that those who have breached [its] law[s] are 
identified and sanctioned after being found responsible.”100  Yet, that 
 
 94. Finn, supra note 93. 
 95. E.g., Amy Davidson, The Ghailani Verdict, NEW YORKER (Nov. 17, 2010), 
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(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2010). 
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legitimacy also depends on the proposition that courts will provide even-
handed justice, including to those accused of the most serious crimes.  In a 
prior generation, some maintained that federal courts were superior to other 
forums (namely, state courts) because of their ability and willingness to 
enforce constitutional protections.101  Yet, the development of an alternative, 
military system for incarcerating terrorism suspects, along with the highly 
charged political climate on national security matters, has both helped make 
protecting rights a liability and tethered the continued legitimacy of federal 
courts to their ability to deliver a specific outcome. 
A related consequence of the forum competition created by military 
detention is the pressure it places on courts to limit rights within the confines 
of the federal prosecution itself.  Again, the Ghailani case is instructive.  
Following his transfer from Guantánamo to the United States, Ghailani moved 
to dismiss the indictment on the ground that it violated his speedy trial rights 
under the Sixth Amendment.102  An indictment against Ghailani had been 
pending in the Southern District of New York since 1998.103  But rather than 
being brought to the United States to stand trial after his seizure in 2004, 
Ghailani was taken first to a CIA “black site,” where he was held for two 
years, and then to Guantánamo, where he was detained for nearly three more 
years.104  The district court nevertheless rejected Ghailani’s speedy trial 
argument under the functional analysis set forth in Barker v. Wingo.105  Judge 
Kaplan found that Ghailani was not prejudiced by the delay because the 
purpose of his prior war on terrorism detention was “to gather intelligence, not 
evidence for use in [his] criminal case.”106  Further, Kaplan said, the alleged 
abuse Ghailani suffered during CIA and military interrogations did not require 
pretrial incarceration that would not have otherwise have occurred since 
Ghailani would have been held as an enemy combatant even if there had been 
no indictment pending against him.107  While the court questioned the 
government’s decision to detain Ghailani at Guantánamo rather than bring him 
to the United States for trial, it found that Ghailani’s initial detention at a CIA 
“black site” had the valid purpose of gathering information through 
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interrogations.108  The district court’s ruling thus underscored how enemy 
combatant detentions—both as a means of gathering intelligence and 
incapacitating terrorism suspects—can limit constitutional protections, such as 
the guarantee of a speedy trial.109 
War on terrorism detentions have created pressure to relax other 
constitutional protections, such as the Miranda requirement, which restricts the 
government’s ability to use as evidence statements made during custodial 
interrogations.110  Critics of using federal courts to prosecute terrorism suspects 
argue that Miranda impedes the government’s ability to gather intelligence and 
neutralize security threats.111  The attempted terrorist attacks by Abdulmutallab 
and Shahzad reignited the controversy over Miranda, with critics arguing that 
providing Miranda warnings to recently arrested terrorism suspects impedes 
the government’s ability to gain useful intelligence.112  Abdulmutallab and 
Shahzad were questioned for nearly one hour and three hours, respectively, 
before Miranda warnings were provided.113  In other cases, the administration 
relied on Miranda’s “public safety exception,” which permits law enforcement 
officers to delay issuing Miranda warnings where the officers need to obtain 
information quickly to prevent further crimes.114  Republican lawmakers 
nevertheless criticized the Obama Administration for treating Abdulmutallab 
and Shahzad as criminal suspects rather than as military prisoners, as doing the 
latter would have permitted the government to continue the interrogations, free 
of any Miranda requirement.115  The Administration defended its decision to 
treat the suspects as criminal detainees, noting that both men provided valuable 
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 109. See id. at 540–41. 
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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1072 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:1055 
intelligence.116  The Administration also said, however, that it would consider 
backing legislation to give officials greater leeway to interrogate terrorism 
suspects as part of a law enforcement investigation.117 
Thus far, the Obama Administration has not pressed for legislation to limit 
Miranda.  It has, however, issued a policy guidance that seeks to give FBI 
agents greater latitude in determining whether, and when, to provide Miranda 
warnings in certain terrorism cases.118  The guidance provides a more flexible 
interpretation of Miranda’s public safety exception, which allows the 
admission of unwarned statements obtained from questioning that is intended 
to prevent some immediate harm to the officers or the public safety rather than 
to elicit testimonial evidence.119  The Supreme Court has held that the 
exception applies to an alleged assailant’s unwarned statements to police 
officers about the location of a gun in a supermarket after the officers noticed 
the assailant’s holster was empty.120  The Obama Administration’s FBI 
guidance argues that the magnitude and complexity of the threat posed by 
terrorist organizations requires a more flexible interpretation of exigency than 
ordinary crime—that is, a broader conception of what questioning may be 
“reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety.”121  The FBI memo 
thus explains that the public safety exception could extend to the questioning 
of “operational terrorist” suspects about “possible impending or coordinated 
terrorist attacks; the location, nature, and threat posed by weapons that might 
post an imminent danger to the public; and the identities, locations, and 
activities or intentions of accomplices who may be plotting additional 
imminent attacks.”122 Additionally, the guidance acknowledges that there may 
be situations where the need to collect “valuable and timely intelligence not 
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related to any immediate threat” warrants continued unwarned questioning, 
even at the cost of the statements being inadmissible.123 
While the FBI guidance’s effect on law enforcement investigations 
remains uncertain, it underscores how the development of an alternative 
system of military detention can help lead to limitations on individual rights 
within the existing law enforcement paradigm.  The prospect of law-of-war 
detention or military commission prosecution—unencumbered by any Miranda 
requirement—places added pressure on the civilian justice system to 
accommodate government demands for increased flexibility in detaining and 
questioning terrorism suspects.  Additionally, it gives policymakers greater 
confidence in staking out aggressive positions—even to the point of expressly 
authorizing unwarned interrogations outside Miranda’s public safety 
exception—because they know that there remains an alternative to criminal 
justice detention should prosecution become infeasible due to the 
inadmissibility of statements obtained in violation of Miranda.124 
Forum competition from military tribunals has also helped mute criticism 
of the government’s broad interpretation of and increased reliance on material 
support statutes to prosecute terrorism suspects for supporting or assisting 
terrorism or designated terrorist organizations.125  In Holder v. Humanitarian 
Law Project,126 the Supreme Court upheld the government’s authority to 
prosecute two groups of Americans for providing assistance to nongovernment 
organizations that had been designated foreign terrorist organizations in those 
organizations’ efforts to seek peaceful resolution of regional conflicts and 
obtain humanitarian assistance.127  While individuals remained free to speak 
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assist a separatist organization in Sri Lanka by training it to apply for humanitarian aid.  Id. at 
2713, 2716. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1074 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:1055 
out on any topic they wished, the Court said, they could be criminally 
prosecuted for providing material support to terrorism, consistent with the First 
Amendment, if the speech was done in concert with a foreign terrorist 
organization and imparted “specialized knowledge” or a “specific skill” to that 
organization.128  The Court thus upheld material-support prosecutions even 
where the speech itself did not advocate terrorism and where the government 
had not provided evidence that the speech would actually increase terrorist 
activity.129  Yet, while civil liberties groups criticized the Court’s decision in 
Holder for “criminalizing [protected] speech meant to promote peace and 
human rights,”130 those groups have also cited the material support statutes in 
defending the use of Article III courts over military tribunals because of the 
broad powers it gives law enforcement to incapacitate terrorism suspects even 
before any terrorist act is even committed.131 
Another effect of this alternative system of military detention is the 
incentive it creates to channel weaker cases away from federal court and 
towards military jurisdiction.  The Obama Administration’s Task Force 
recommended a federal prosecution of the 9/11 conspirators not only because 
of the severity of the crime, but also because of its confidence that federal 
prosecutors could obtain a conviction.132  By contrast, where the Task Force 
was less confident about a conviction for evidentiary, procedural, or other 
reasons, but was still opposed to the detainee’s transfer to another country, it 
recommended indefinite law-of-war detention under the AUMF.133  
Paradoxically, therefore, it is the weaker cases—those in which the federal 
criminal justice system’s protections matter most to the accused—that will 
most likely be channeled towards military detention because that forum’s rules 
so heavily favor the government. 
 
 128. Id. at 2722–24. 
 129. Erwin Chemerinsky, Not a Free Speech Court, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 723, 730 (2011); see 
also Aziz Z. Huq, The Signaling Function of Religious Speech in Domestic Counterterrorism, 89 
TEX. L. REV. 833, 893 (2011) (explaining that Holder “reduce[s] constitutional protection against 
guilt by association in a class of cases defined by the government to a token ban on membership 
proscription that government can easily circumvent”). 
 130. See, e.g., Supreme Court Rules “Material Support” Law Can Stand, AM. CIVIL 
LIBERTIES UNION (June 21, 2010), http://www.aclu.org/national-security/supreme-court-rules-
material-support-law-can-stand (quoting former President Jimmy Carter). 
 131. See, e.g., RICHARD B. ZABEL & JAMES J. BENJAMIN, JR., HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, IN 
PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING TERRORISM CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 31–38 (2008), 
available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/080521-USLS-pursuit-
justice.pdf; Fact Sheet: Trying Terror Suspects in Federal Court, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/USLS-Fact-Sheet-Courts.pdf, 1 (last 
modified Mar. 1, 2012). 
 132. FINAL REPORT, supra note 54, at 19–21. 
 133. Id. at 23–24. 
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III.  CIVIL REMEDIES AND THE VANISHING FEDERAL FORUM 
Civil litigation by individuals seeking redress for torture and other abuses 
surfaces similar debates about the viability of federal courts as a forum for 
terrorism cases.  Federal courts have repeatedly dismissed actions by 
noncitizens against U.S. officials seeking damages for arbitrary detention, 
torture, and other mistreatment.134  The dismissals, which rest on various 
grounds, including the “state secrets” privilege, Bivens’s “special factors,” and 
qualified immunity, typically cite the twin concerns of separation of powers 
and limited judicial capacity as reasons for denying litigants a federal forum.135  
The decisions portray federal courts as unable to provide remedies for even the 
most egregious rights violations.  That some judges have been willing to 
exercise jurisdiction over the relatively few civil damages actions brought by 
U.S. citizens136 only highlights the degree to which broader criticisms of 
federal court review in this area have gained acceptance, including among 
federal judges themselves. 
Suits brought by individuals in connection with the CIA’s “extraordinary 
rendition” program137 have foundered on state secrets grounds.  In El-Masri v. 
United States, the Fourth Circuit upheld the district court’s dismissal of a 
lawsuit filed by Khaled El-Masri, a German citizen who was seized while 
traveling in Macedonia and rendered by the CIA to Afghanistan, where he was 
secretly detained and tortured.138  Similarly, in Mohamed v. Jeppesen 
Dataplan, Inc.,139 a narrowly divided Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, upheld the 
dismissal on state secrets grounds of an action brought by five individuals who 
had been subjected to the CIA’s extraordinary rendition program.140  The 
plaintiffs in that case had sued Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., a U.S. corporation, for 
 
 134. See, e.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 565, 567, 582 (2d Cir. 2009) (affirming the 
district court’s dismissal of a complaint brought by a dual citizen of Syria and Canada against 
federal officials seeking damages for harms suffered as a result of his detention, confinement, and 
interrogation); Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 528, 533 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (affirming the district 
court’s dismissal of a complaint brought by four British nationals against Donald Rumsfeld and 
military officials seeking damages for illegal detainment and mistreatment); El-Masri v. United 
States, 479 F.3d 296, 300, 313 (4th Cir. 2007) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of a 
complaint brought by a German citizen against George Tenet and other CIA employees seeking 
damages for being held against his will and other mistreatment suffered during his detention). 
 135. See infra notes 142–93 and accompanying text. 
 136. See infra notes 206–09 and accompanying text. 
 137. The CIA’s “extraordinary rendition” program is defined as “the clandestine abduction 
and detention outside the United States of persons suspected of involvement in terrorist activities, 
and their subsequent interrogation using methods impermissible under U.S. and international 
laws.”  El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 300. 
 138. Id. at 300, 313. 
 139. 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
 140. Id. at 1073–75. 
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its role in transporting them among various locations where they were secretly 
detained and tortured by the CIA.141 
In El-Masri and Jeppesen, the appeals courts dismissed the lawsuits under 
the state secrets privilege,142 as recognized by the Supreme Court in United 
States v. Reynolds.143  Their application of the privilege rested on two 
overarching factors: the separation of powers concerns that would be raised by 
judicial review of the plaintiffs’ allegations144 and the limited institutional 
capacity of the judiciary in matters affecting national security and sensitive 
foreign policy questions.145  As to the separation of powers, the Fourth Circuit 
in El-Masri determined that because the state secrets privilege has a 
constitutional basis, it limits judicial interference with military and foreign 
affairs matters committed to the executive branch.146  Thus, the court 
suggested, allowing a suit challenging a secret CIA detention and interrogation 
program to proceed could bring the judiciary into constitutional conflict with 
the executive.147  The Ninth Circuit’s en banc opinion in Jeppesen similarly 
underscored the need for judicial deference to the executive on matters of 
foreign policy and national security.148 
Questions about the institutional competency of courts weighed heavily in 
both cases.  El-Masri emphasized the superiority of executive and intelligence 
agencies in evaluating the consequences of relying on sensitive government 
information.149  “[G]iven the sophisticated nature of modern intelligence 
analysis,” the court explained, judges lack the ability to determine how one 
seemingly innocuous item of information might be of great significance when 
 
 141. Id. at 1075. 
 142. Id. at 1093; El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 313. 
 143. 345 U.S. 1, 6–7, 10 (1953).  Under Reynolds, a court must honor the executive’s 
assertion of the privilege if it determines that the privilege is valid and that “from all the 
circumstances of the case, that there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will 
expose military matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulged.”  Id. at 
10. 
 144. See Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1081–82; El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 303. 
 145. See Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1081–82; El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 305. 
 146. See El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 303 (“Although the state secrets privilege was developed at 
common law, it performs a function of constitutional significance, because it allows the executive 
branch to protect information whose secrecy is necessary to its military and foreign-affairs 
responsibilities.”). 
 147. See id. (“[T]he state secrets doctrine allow[s] the Court to avoid the constitutional 
conflict that might have arisen had the judiciary demanded that the Executive disclose highly 
sensitive military secrets.”). 
 148. Jeppesen, 614 F.3d 1081–82  (quoting Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 
F.3d 1190, 1203 (9th Cir. 2007)) (“[W]e acknowledge the need to defer to the Executive on 
matters of foreign policy and national security and surely cannot legitimately find ourselves 
second guessing the Executive in this arena.”). 
 149. El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 305. 
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viewed in its proper context.150  Similarly, the court suggested that judges 
cannot properly assess the risk of diplomatic fall-out resulting from the failure 
to protect sensitive information from disclosure.151 
In Jeppesen, the original appellate panel had reversed the district court’s 
decision dismissing the suit on state secrets grounds.152  In his dissent from the 
en banc opinion, Judge Hawkins, the author of the Ninth Circuit panel 
decision,153 explained that the state secrets privilege extends only to evidence, 
and not to facts, and thus cannot be used “to prevent a litigant from persuading 
a jury of the truth or falsity of an allegation by reference to non-privileged 
evidence,” even if the privileged evidence “might also be probative of the truth 
or falsity of the allegation.”154  The Reynolds privilege, Hawkins reasoned, 
must be asserted by the government with respect to specific pieces of evidence 
and on an item-by-item basis, rather than through its wholesale application to 
the plaintiffs’ allegations.155  Although Hawkins recognized that some 
evidence in Jeppesen might be subject to the state secrets privilege, the 
plaintiffs must still have the opportunity to establish their claims with non-
privileged evidence,156 including the evidence about the extraordinary 
rendition program and Jeppesen’s role in it, that was already in the public 
domain and thus not protected by the privilege.157 
The en banc court rejected this more limited interpretation of the state 
secrets privilege.158  It assumed that the plaintiffs’ prima facie case and 
 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 579 F.3d 943, 951–52, 962 (9th Cir. 2009), reh’g 
en banc granted, 586 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 153. See id., 579 F.3d at 949. 
 154. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1099 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) 
(Hawkins, J., dissenting). 
 155. Id. at 1099 n.13.  A separate form of the state secrets privilege bars suit where the entire 
subject of the litigation is a state secret.  See Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 105–07 (1875) 
(dismissing suit by a spy for alleged breach of an agreement with the government to compensate 
him for his wartime espionage services); see also Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 3 (2005) (relying on 
Totten in dismissing claims by two former Cold War spies who accused the CIA of reneging on a 
commitment to provide financial support in exchange for their espionage services).  The en banc 
court in Jeppesen rested its decision on the narrower Reynolds bar.  Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1085 
(majority opinion) (declining to decide whether the suit was barred under Totten because the 
Reynolds bar applied). 
 156. Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1100–01 (Hawkins, J., dissenting). 
 157. See id. at 1095 & n.2 (stating that the plaintiffs in Jeppesen submitted more than 1,800 
pages of documents regarding the extraordinary rendition program, which were in the public 
record and were summarized as an Appendix to the dissent). 
 158. See id. at 1087 (majority opinion) (holding that dismissal is required even if it is 
assumed that the plaintiffs could prove their case with non-privileged evidence). 
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Jeppesen’s defenses might not necessarily depend on privileged evidence.159  It 
concluded, however, that it would be too difficult for a court to separate 
privileged from non-privileged evidence or to manage properly the risks of 
unintended disclosure of sensitive information.160  More specifically, the court 
concluded that, because the facts underlying the plaintiffs’ claims were “so 
infused with [state] secrets, any plausible effort by Jeppesen to defend against 
them would create an unjustifiable risk of revealing [those] secrets.”161  The 
appeals court thus affirmed the district court’s pleading-stage dismissal, even 
though it recognized that the result left the plaintiffs without the possibility of a 
judicial remedy for allegedly egregious violations of their rights.162 
Similar perceptions about limited judicial competency on matters 
implicating national security and foreign policy have led to Rule 12 dismissals 
of Bivens claims seeking redress from arbitrary detention and torture.  In its 
1971 decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics, the Supreme Court established that individuals may obtain a 
judicially created damages remedy for constitutional torts committed by 
federal officials.163  The Court noted, however, that a judicial remedy might 
not be appropriate when “special factors counsel[] hesitation in the absence of 
affirmative action by Congress.”164  The Supreme Court has previously found 
that special factors preclude a Bivens remedy when Congress has created a 
comprehensive remedial scheme,165 when the suit would interfere with the 
military’s internal disciplinary structure,166 or when defining a workable cause 
of action proves too difficult.167  In Arar v. Ashcroft, however, the Second 
Circuit expanded this exception in concluding that national security itself could 
 
 159. Id.  The en banc panel also assumed, without deciding, that the Totten bar did not apply.  
Id. at 1085. 
 160. Id. at 1088. 
 161. Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1088. 
 162. Id. at 1089, 1091–93. 
 163. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395 
(1971). 
 164. Id. at 396. 
 165. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 423–24, 429 (1988) (dismissing due to Congress’s 
creation of a comprehensive remedial scheme for Social Security benefits). 
 166. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 297, 304–05 (1983) (dismissing a suit by enlisted 
men against superior officers for racial discrimination in duty assignments and performance 
evaluations). 
 167. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 543, 562, 567–68 (2007) (dismissing a suit by a 
landowner against federal officials, who allegedly interfered with the landowner’s exercise of 
property rights through harassment and intimidation because creating “a new Bivens remedy to 
redress such injuries collectively . . . raises a serious difficulty of devising a workable cause of 
action”). 
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constitute a special factor that warrants dismissal in the absence of express 
congressional action creating a damages remedy.168 
Arar’s complaint alleged that U.S. government agents, including high-level 
Justice Department officials, conspired to render him from the United States to 
Syria, where he was detained incommunicado for nearly a year and tortured.169  
In a divided decision, the Second Circuit, sitting en banc, upheld the district 
court’s dismissal of Arar’s Bivens claims against the officials based on special 
factors.170  Like El-Masri and Jeppesen, Arar framed concerns about judicial 
involvement in terms of both constitutional separation of powers and 
institutional capacity.  In particular, the Second Circuit underscored the 
problems a federal court would face in managing the litigation without 
jeopardizing national security or harming the country’s foreign relations.171  
Those problems included the presence of classified and other sensitive 
information,172 the risk of intruding on the sensitive area of diplomatic 
communications surrounding prisoner transfers,173 and the risk of “graymail,” 
as the government would face pressure to settle the case on terms favorable to 
the plaintiff merely to avoid intrusive discovery or to prevent sensitive 
information from becoming public.174  Although the challenges presented by 
classified and other sensitive information are not unique to extraordinary 
rendition, the panel questioned whether judges could handle those challenges 
in the context of national security.175  It concluded that judges should not 
entertain suits for the harms caused by extraordinary rendition absent 
legislation by Congress expressly providing for a civil damages remedy, as 
Congress “alone has the institutional competence to set parameters, delineate 
safe harbors, and specify relief.”176  Indeed, the court said, judges lacked 
competence not merely to decide the various evidentiary and case management 
issues raised by the suit, but also to identify the line between constitutional and 
unconstitutional conduct.177  It thus contrasted suits against government 
officials for extraordinary rendition with those against prison guards for 
 
 168. 585 F.3d 559, 574–76 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
 169. Id. at 566. 
 170. Id. at 574, 582. 
 171. Id. at 574. 
 172. Id. at 576–77. 
 173. Arar, 585 F.3d at 578. 
 174. Id. at 578–79. 
 175. See id. at 575–76 (stating that courts “have long been hesitant to intrude” on “matters 
touching upon foreign policy and national security” and noting that in order to probe the basis of 
the plaintiff’s designation as a terrorist and his removal to Syria, the district court would have to 
consider the actions of the national security apparatus of at least three foreign countries plus the 
United States). 
 176. Id. at 564. 
 177. Id. at 580. 
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beating an inmate or against agents for executing a warrantless search, 
explaining “that the context of extraordinary rendition is so different, involving 
as it does a complex and rapidly changing legal framework beset with critical 
legal judgments that have not yet been made, as well as policy choices that are 
by no means easily reached.”178 
The D.C. Circuit applied a similar logic in dismissing damages suits 
against high-ranking government officials by individuals previously held in 
military custody.  In Rasul v. Myers, the court identified “[t]he danger of 
obstructing U.S. national security policy” as a basis for dismissing a Bivens 
suit brought by four former detainees who claimed they had been tortured and 
abused at Guantánamo.179  Additionally, in Ali v. Rumsfeld, the court held that 
special factors precluded a Bivens remedy for individuals previously 
imprisoned in Iraq and Afghanistan.180  Civil damages litigation, the court 
explained, would hinder U.S. armed forces and disrupt the war effort.181 
Although not decided on Bivens special factors or state secrets grounds, the 
Supreme Court’s five-Justice majority decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal adopts a 
similar view of the limitations of federal courts in adjudicating challenges to 
illegal government conduct in the national security context.182  In the months 
after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the government arrested and detained 
approximately 762 individuals on immigration charges, a number of whom 
were designated “high interest” detainees and were held under highly 
“restrictive conditions designed to prevent them from communicating with the 
general prison population or the outside world.”183  One of those detainees, 
Javier Iqbal, brought suit under Bivens against various federal officials, 
including former Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert 
Mueller, for their role in his detention and treatment.184  Iqbal, a Muslim from 
 
 178. Arar, 585 F.3d at 580. 
 179. Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 528, 532 n.5, 533 (D.C. Cir. 2009).  Although the court 
dismissed the Bivens claims on qualified immunity grounds, it identified special factors as an 
alternative basis for dismissal of the claims.  Id. at 532 & n.5; see also Al-Zahrani v. Rumsfeld, 
684 F. Supp. 2d 103, 105, 112 (D.D.C. 2010) (relying on Rasul v. Myers in dismissing a wrongful 
death action by families of two former Guantánamo detainees who died in U.S. custody at the 
Guantanamo prison on, inter alia, Bivens special factors grounds), aff’d on other grounds, Al-
Zahrani v. Rodriguez, No. 10-5393, 2012 WL 539370 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 21, 2012) (holding that 
habeas corpus statute amendments deprived the federal courts of jurisdiction over the action). 
 180. Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 764, 774 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 181. Id. at 773–74. 
 182. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953–54 (2009) (rejecting the “careful-case-
management approach,” which permits limited discovery against high-ranking government 
officials to determine whether a misconduct claim should proceed, and finding that there are 
“serious and legitimate reasons” to preserve, as much as possible, those officials’ qualified 
immunity, especially during this “unprecedented” security emergency). 
 183. Id. at 1943. 
 184. Id. at 1943–44. 
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Pakistan, contended that Ashcroft and Mueller violated his rights by labeling 
him a “high interest” detainee and causing him to endure abusive treatment on 
account of his race, religion, and/or national origin.185  The Supreme Court 
held that the claims against Ashcroft and Mueller should be dismissed because 
Iqbal had failed to plead sufficient facts to establish their plausibility and that 
other explanations were equally plausible—namely, that “a legitimate policy 
directing law enforcement to arrest and detain individuals because of their 
suspected link to the attacks would produce a disparate, incidental impact on 
Arab Muslims” since “[t]he September 11 attacks were perpetrated by 19 Arab 
Muslim hijackers”186 and that Iqbal and others were labeled “high interest” 
detainees not because of their race, religion, or national origin but because the 
government “sought to keep suspected terrorists in the most secure conditions 
available until the suspects could be cleared of terrorist activity.”187 
Iqbal suggests the Court’s resistance to allowing civil damages litigation 
based on decisions made by government officials in the counterterrorism 
context, especially where that litigation seeks to hold high-level government 
officials liable.188  The Court, to be sure, did not condone Iqbal’s physical and 
emotional abuse in detention, nor did it seek to prevent Iqbal’s Bivens claims 
against individual prison guards from going forward.189  Still, it barred any 
challenge to the government’s broader arrest and detention policies in the 
 
 185. Id. at 1942, 1944.  Iqbal alleged, for example, that his jailors “‘kicked him in the 
stomach, punched him in the face, and dragged him across’ his cell without justification, 
subjected him to serial strip and body-cavity searches when he posed no safety risk to himself or 
others, and refused to let him and other Muslims pray because there would be ‘[n]o prayers for 
terrorists.’”  Id. at 1944 (internal citations omitted). 
 186. Id. at 1950–52.  The Court’s language seems to suggest mistakenly that all Muslims are 
Arabs.  Iqbal himself, for example, was not; he was a Muslim from Pakistan.  Id. at 1942. 
 187. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1952.  In April of 2002, Iqbal pleaded guilty to federal criminal 
charges of conspiracy to defraud the United States and fraud with identification.  Iqbal v. Hasty, 
490 F.3d 143, 148 n.1, 149 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).  He was deported to 
Pakistan following his release from prison.  Id. at 149. 
 188. The Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011), demonstrates a 
similar pattern.  There, a U.S. citizen sued then-Attorney General John Ashcroft for pretextual use 
of the material witness statute to detain him where the government lacked sufficient evidence to 
charge him criminally.  Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2079.  The Court unanimously reversed the 
decision of the Ninth Circuit and held that Ashcroft was entitled to qualified immunity.  Id. at 
2085 (holding that Ashcroft was entitled to qualified immunity whether or not his conduct was 
lawful).  The Court further held (by a 5-3 majority) that Ashcroft’s conduct could not have 
violated the Fourth Amendment because an arrest made under a validly obtained material witness 
warrant is lawful regardless of a government official’s subjective intent.  Id. at 2083 & n.3. 
 189. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1952 (“[Plaintiff’s] account of his prison ordeal alleges serious 
official misconduct that we need not address here.”); see also id. at 1942 (“[Plaintiff’s] account of 
his prison ordeal could, if proved, demonstrate unconstitutional misconduct by some 
governmental actors.  But the allegations and pleadings with respect to these actors are not before 
us here.”). 
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aftermath of 9/11 and any judicial inquiry into the role high-level officials like 
Ashcroft and Mueller played in formulating those policies.190  Such litigation, 
the Court said, exacts “heavy costs in terms of efficiency and expenditure of 
valuable time and resources that might otherwise be directed to the proper 
execution of the work of the Government.”191  According to the Court, those 
costs not only outweigh any benefit gained in ensuring that officials comply 
with the law, but also are magnified in the national security context, 
particularly when high-level government officials must respond to “a national 
and international security emergency” like 9/11.192  The Court thus rejected 
Iqbal’s suggestion that careful case management provided a way for judges to 
minimize the costs of civil damages litigation in allowing litigation to proceed 
beyond the pleading stage and deferring decision on an official’s qualified 
immunity defense until summary judgment and after an opportunity for 
discovery.193 
Federal courts have also dismissed civil damages actions against civilian 
contractors for alleged torture and other abuses.  In Saleh v. Titan Corp., Iraqi 
nationals brought suit against two private military contractors that provided 
military services to the U.S. government at the Abu Ghraib military prison in 
Iraq,194 alleging that they were beaten, electrocuted, raped, and subjected to 
attacks by dogs.195  A divided D.C. Circuit panel held that the plaintiffs’ claims 
should be dismissed.196  In finding that plaintiffs’ state law tort claims were 
federally preempted, the panel broadly construed the exemption in the Federal 
Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) for claims “arising out of the combatant activities 
of the military or armed forces . . . during time of war.”197  Although plaintiffs 
had argued there was no conflict with federal policy because federal law 
prohibits torture, the appeals court found that the claims were preempted by a 
broader federal policy—embodied in the FTCA’s “combatant activities” 
exception—to eliminate tort liability from the battlefield.198  In reaching this 
conclusion, the court emphasized the risks of “judicial probing of the 
 
 190. See Aziz Z. Huq, Against National Security Exceptionalism, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 225, 
248 (explaining how Iqbal shows that while “[c]hallenges against discrete, isolated, and 
unauthorized acts of abuse sometimes prevail, . . . suits targeting allegedly unconstitutional 
policies will be turned away at the courthouse door”). 
 191. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953. 
 192. Id. (quoting Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 179 (2d Cir. 2007) (Cabranes, J., concurring)). 
 193. Id. 
 194. Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 195. Id. at 17 (Garland, J., dissenting). 
 196. Id. at 2, 17 (majority opinion). 
 197. Id. at 5–6.  The panel also upheld the dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims against Titan under 
the Alien Tort Statute.  Id. at 3, 5. 
 198. Id. at 7. 
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government’s wartime policies,”199 much as other courts had done in applying 
the state secrets privilege and Bivens special factors to dismiss lawsuits at the 
pleading stage. 
A divided Fourth Circuit panel reached a similar conclusion in Al-Shimari 
v. CACI International, Inc., another suit by Iraqi nationals against a civilian 
contractor retained by the U.S. military to assist it in conducting 
interrogations.200  In concluding that the plaintiffs’ claims were federally 
preempted for the reasons articulated in Saleh, the Fourth Circuit reversed the 
district judge’s ruling that discovery was required to determine whether the 
interrogations conducted by the contractors constituted “combatant activities” 
within the meaning of the FTCA’s exception.201  The panel underscored the 
“significant conflict with federal interests” that would result “from allowing 
tort law generally to apply to foreign battlefields.”202  Like Saleh, Al-Shimari 
presumed that the kind of judicial inquiry associated with tort litigation is 
inconsistent with the pursuit of warfare, even when the premise of the litigation 
is that civilian contractors acted contrary to or in violation of federal rules and 
directives on the treatment of prisoners.203  After agreeing to rehear the Al-
Shimari case en banc,204 the full Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeals on the 
ground that the district court’s rulings were not immediately appealable under 
the “collateral order” doctrine.205  The en banc court’s decision thus defers any 
determination on defendants’ preemption arguments until after further 
litigation in the district court. 
Other courts have allowed damages actions by U.S. citizen plaintiffs to 
proceed past the pleading stage.  In Vance v. Rumsfeld, a divided Seventh 
Circuit panel upheld the district court’s refusal to dismiss a Bivens claim by 
two U.S. citizen civilians against former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld 
for their torture and mistreatment in Iraq.206  The Seventh Circuit panel 
 
 199. Saleh, 580 F.3d at 8. 
 200. Al-Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 658 F.3d 413, 414 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 201. Id. at 415, 419–20.  The panel has also interpreted the collateral order doctrine broadly to 
consider the defendants’ interlocutory appeal of the district court’s refusal to dismiss the suit on 
federal preemption grounds.  Al-Quraishi v. L-3 Servs., Inc., 657 F.3d 201, 203–05 (4th Cir.  
2011). 
 202. Al-Shimari, 658 F.3d at 419. 
 203. Id.; see also id. at 430 (arguing that the majority’s assertion of this conflict is erroneous 
as “[n]o federal interest implicates the torture and abuse of detainees.”) (King, J., dissenting). 
 204. Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 658 F.3d 413 (4th Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc granted, No. 
09-1335 (4th Cir. Nov. 8, 2011). 
 205. Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., Nos. 09–1335, 10–1891, 10–1921, 2012 WL 1656773, at 
*4, *13 (4th Cir. May 11, 2012) (en banc). 
 206. Vance v. Rumsfeld, 653 F.3d 591, 594 (7th Cir. 2011), vacated and reh’g en banc 
granted, Nos. 10-1687 & 10-2442, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 22083 (7th Cir. Oct. 28, 2011).  Judge 
Manion dissented from the court’s decision to allow the Bivens claims to proceed.  See id. at 627–
28, 632 (Manion, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  The U.S. District Court for the 
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recognized that litigation involving the treatment of detainees in a war zone 
raised concerns about judicial interference with military decision-making.207  
But those concerns, it said, did not warrant dismissal where it would leave 
plaintiffs with no other remedy and risk immunizing grave constitutional 
violations.208  The panel emphasized the importance of U.S. citizenship in 
distinguishing Arar, Ali, and Rasul, where the plaintiffs, like those Vance, had 
no other judicial remedy and where dismissal meant immunizing egregious 
government misconduct.209  If the Vance panel demonstrated more confidence 
in the judiciary’s ability to handle the evidentiary challenges litigation of an 
overseas detention case posed, it also believed the plaintiffs’ U.S. citizenship 
affected whether the judiciary should tackle those challenges and allow the 
case to proceed to discovery.  The full Seventh Circuit, however, has vacated 
the panel’s opinion and agreed to rehear the case en banc.210 
Civil litigation involving former “enemy combatant” Jose Padilla has 
similarly presented the question of whether U.S. citizens can pursue a damages 
remedy for unlawful detention and mistreatment arising out of the war on 
terrorism.  A district court in South Carolina dismissed Jose Padilla’s Bivens 
suit against former government officials for torture and other abuses 
committed during his prior military confinement as an enemy combatant,211 
while a district court in the Northern District of California ruled that a similar 
suit could proceed to discovery.212 
 
District of Columbia refused to dismiss a similar claim for violation of substantive due process by 
a former contractor who asserts he was abused by the military in Iraq.  See Doe v. Rumsfeld, 800 
F. Supp. 2d 94, 100–01, 111, 126 (D.D.C. 2011), appeal docketed, No. 11-5209 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 
22, 2011). 
 207. Vance, 653 F.3d at 618 (“We are sensitive to the defendants’ concerns that the judiciary 
should not interfere with military decision-making.”). 
 208. Id. at 618, 624 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 535 (2004) (plurality 
opinion)) (“‘[W]hile we accord the greatest respect and consideration to the judgments of military 
authorities in matters relating to the actual prosecution of a war, and recognize that the scope of 
that discretion necessarily is wide, it does not infringe on the core role of the military for the 
courts to exercise their own time-honored and constitutionally mandated roles of reviewing and 
resolving claims.’”). 
 209. Id. at 619–20, 622 (“The fact that the plaintiffs are U.S. citizens is a key consideration 
here as we weigh whether a Bivens action may proceed.”).  The court did note that, unlike U.S. 
citizens, foreign nationals could petition their own respective governments to seek redress for the 
violations.  Id. at 620 n.19. 
 210. Vance v. Rumsfeld, Nos. 10-1687 & 10-2442, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 22083 (7th Cir. 
Oct. 28, 2011). 
 211. Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 764 F. Supp. 2d 787, 790 (D.S.C. 2011) (dismissing Padilla’s 
Bivens suit against Rumsfeld and other government officials for his treatment as an enemy 
combatant in the Navy brig in Charleston, South Carolina). 
 212. Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1012, 1014–15, 1030, 1039–40 (N.D. Cal. 2009) 
(denying the motion to dismiss Padilla’s Bivens suit against John Yoo, the former Deputy 
Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel, for his role in the decision to designate Padilla 
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On appeal from the South Carolina district court decision, the Fourth 
Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Padilla’s suit.213  The Fourth Circuit 
concluded that the military detention and treatment of an enemy combatant 
during wartime presented “special factors” counseling hesitation.214  The court 
cited both the separation of powers concerns triggered by judicial review of 
executive-branch action in this area215 and the judiciary’s limited competence 
in adjudicating claims challenging military decisions during wartime.216  
Absent affirmative action by Congress to create a damages remedy for enemy 
combatants, the court reasoned, judges should stay their Bivens hand.217 
The Ninth Circuit also ordered dismissal of Padilla’s separate suit brought 
in the Northern District of California, thus reversing the district judge’s 
decision in that case.218  The Ninth Circuit, however, did not reach the issue of 
Bivens “special factors,” instead resting its decision on the ground that the 
defendant, former Office of Legal Counsel attorney John Yoo, was entitled to 
qualified immunity.219  Unlike the Fourth Circuit, therefore, the Ninth Circuit 
did not deem Padilla’s suit non-justiciable but rather concluded that Padilla 
was not subjected to treatment that violated any clearly established 
constitutional right.220 
 
an enemy combatant and for his subsequent treatment in the Navy brig in Charleston, South 
Carolina). 
 213. Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540, 544 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 214. Id. at 548, 551. 
 215. Id. at 548–52.  The court further explained that the need for judicial deference is greatest 
where, as in Padilla’s case, the executive acted pursuant to the type of broad delegation of power 
contained in the AUMF.  Id. at 549–50. 
 216. Id. at 552–56. 
 217. Id. at 552 (quoting United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507, 513 (1954)) (“[C]reating a 
cause of action [under these circumstances] is ‘more appropriately for those who write the laws, 
rather than for those who interpret them.’”). 
 218. Padilla v. Yoo, No. 09-16478, 2012 WL 1526156, at *15 (9th Cir. May 2, 2012). 
 219. Id. at *1, *15. 
 220. Id. at *1.  The appeals court reached its qualified immunity ruling for two reasons: first, 
because at the time in question it was not clearly established that an enemy combatant possessed 
the same constitutional rights as an ordinary convicted prisoner or accused criminal; and second, 
because although it was clearly established that the torture of a U.S. citizen violated the 
Constitution, it was not clearly established at the time that the treatment to which Padilla was 
subjected amounted to torture.  Id.  For a critical assessment of the Ninth Circuit’s qualified 
immunity analysis, see David Cole, No Accountability for Torture, NYR BLOG (May 7, 2012, 
3:05 PM), http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2012/may/07/john-yoo-jose-padilla-torture-
lawsuit/, and Jonathan Hafetz, The Ninth Circuit’s Dismissal in Padilla: The Accountability Gap 
Widens, BALKINIZATION (May 3, 2012, 1:33 AM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2012/05/ninth-
circuits-dismissal-in-padilla.html. 
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The government has also relied on similar “special factors” arguments in 
moving to dismiss a lawsuit221 by a U.S. citizen who was secretly rendered, 
detained, and mistreated by FBI agents in the Horn of Africa.222  The 
government’s motion in that case, Meshal v. Higgenbotham, is pending before 
the federal district court in Washington, D.C.223 
The outcome of these citizen-damages suits thus remains uncertain, and 
U.S. citizen challenges to other national security practices, like targeted killing, 
have failed on justiciability grounds.224  Even if, however, courts ultimately 
permit citizen-damages suits to proceed past the pleading stage—which looks 
increasingly unlikely absent Supreme Court intervention—it would not alter 
the non-availability of a federal forum for the larger category of cases brought 
by noncitizens that challenge national security detention and interrogation 
practices.225  Instead, citizen-damages suits will, at most, represent a narrow 
exception to the general bar against civil litigation seeking redress for abuses 
in the war on terrorism—an exception rooted in the heightened obligation 
courts believe are due U.S. citizens, the rights U.S. citizens possess compared 
to noncitizens, and the limited number of citizen-damages cases that are likely 
to be brought.  U.S. citizen cases, if allowed, will thus proceed not because of a 
belief in the judiciary’s ability to address the various concerns surrounding 
classified information, military and intelligence operations, and diplomatic 
relations, but rather because of a normative determination that such litigation 
should be permitted in that narrow category of cases despite those concerns. 
IV.  FEDERAL COURTS AS NATIONAL SECURITY DETENTION COURTS 
Another post-9/11 model for federal court adjudication centers on judicial 
review of military detention through the exercise of habeas corpus jurisdiction.  
Here, courts have served two main and interrelated functions: first, as a forum 
for examining broader policies concerning the military detention and trial of 
terrorism suspects; and second, as a forum for deciding the merits of individual 
detainee cases.  These functions have been exercised mainly in the context of 
 
 221. See Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint Filed by Defendants Chris 
Higginbotham, Steve Hersem, John Doe 1, and John Doe 2 at 8–18, Meshal v. Higgenbotham, 
No. 09-cv-2178-EGS (D.D.C. June 23, 2010), ECF No. 33 [hereinafter Higgenbotham’s Motion 
to Dismiss]. 
 222. Amended Complaint for Damages and Declaratory Relief at 1–3, Meshal v. 
Higgenbotham, No. 09-cv-2178-EGS (D.D.C. May 10, 2010), ECF No. 31.  I am co-counsel with 
the American Civil Liberties Union for the plaintiff Amir Meshal in this lawsuit. 
 223. See Higgenbotham’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 221. 
 224. See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8, 11, 35, 52 (D.D.C. 2010) (dismissing, for 
lack of standing and on political question grounds, a “next friend” lawsuit by father of U.S. 
citizen, Anwar al-Aulaqi, challenging his son’s placement on the U.S. government’s “targeted 
killing” list based on his son’s alleged terrorist activities in Yemen). 
 225. See supra note 134 (collecting cases brought by noncitizens). 
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the Guantánamo detainee litigation, where courts have largely accepted and 
accommodated the government’s adoption of a new form of detention outside 
the criminal justice system even as they have selectively resisted the 
executive’s effort to deprive them of any role in determining its contours. 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,226 Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld,227 and Boumediene v. Bush,228 all illustrate how the judiciary can 
serve as a forum for review of war on terror detention practices.  Hamdi and 
Boumediene demonstrate how courts, through the exercise of their habeas 
jurisdiction, can examine both the category of individuals who may be lawfully 
held in military custody and the process they must be afforded to justify their 
continued confinement.  In Hamdi, the Court held that the President’s AUMF-
based military detention authority extended, at minimum, to individuals who 
were part of or were supporting forces hostile to the United States in 
Afghanistan and who engaged in armed conflict against the United States or its 
coalition partners there.229  Such individuals, the Court said, could be detained 
as enemy combatants for the duration of the armed conflict.230  The Court left 
further development of the parameters of the enemy combatant category to 
future cases.231  While it cautioned against expanding that category too far,232 
the Court nevertheless sanctioned the theory that enemy-combatant detention 
provided an alternative to federal criminal detention and that those properly 
categorized as enemy combatants could be held indefinitely to prevent their 
“return to the battlefield.”233 
Four years later, in Boumediene, the Court reaffirmed that judges 
exercising habeas corpus jurisdiction in Guantánamo detainee cases could 
determine the legitimate scope of the government’s AUMF-based military 
detention authority, but did not further address the scope of that authority.234  
 
 226. 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 227. 548 U.S. 557 (2006), superseded by statute, Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. 
No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600. 
 228. 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 229. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516–18 (plurality opinion). 
 230. Id. at 521. 
 231. Id. at 522 n.1. 
 232. Id. at 521 (noting that “[i]f the practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely 
unlike those of the conflicts that informed the development of the law of war,” the 
“understanding” that the AUMF authorizes detention “may unravel”). 
 233. Id. at 519. 
 234. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 788 (noting that courts, as part of their constitutionally 
mandated habeas jurisdiction, must have authority to consider the petitioners’ “most basic claim: 
that the President has no authority under the AUMF to detain them indefinitely”); see also id. at 
790 (“If a detainee can present reasonably available evidence demonstrating there is no basis for 
his continued detention, he must have the opportunity to present this evidence to a habeas corpus 
court.”).  In Hamdan, the Court suggested the government had continued authority to militarily 
detain at least some individuals seized in the non-international armed conflict against al Qaeda, 
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Since Boumediene, however, lower courts have elaborated on that standard in 
adjudicating individual habeas petitions, determining that the President has 
authority under the AUMF to detain individuals who were part of or who 
supported al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces that are engaged in 
hostilities with the United States or its coalition partners.235  These courts have 
extended AUMF-based detention authority beyond the narrow circumstances 
present in Hamdi, refusing to limit that authority to individuals who were 
captured on a battlefield or who took part in the armed conflict in Afghanistan 
(as opposed to the global armed conflict against al Qaeda and associated 
forces).236 
Hamdi and Boumediene also addressed the process to which the petitioners 
were entitled in challenging their law-of-war-based detention under the 
AUMF.  In both cases, the Court found the existing process inadequate—under 
the Due Process Clause in Hamdi237 and under the Suspension Clause in 
Boumediene238—and ordered individualized judicial determinations to remedy 
the defect.  Although the decisions rested on different constitutional 
provisions, they both maintained that a constitutionally adequate process had to 
provide detainees with a meaningful opportunity to challenge the government’s 
assertions before a neutral decisionmaker.239  The decisions also acknowledged 
that a military tribunal could provide an adequate fact-finding process if it 
contained sufficient procedural safeguards.240  But where the military fact-
finding process was as deficient or tainted by bias as it was in Hamdi and 
Boumediene, the Due Process Clause (Hamdi) and Suspension Clause 
 
but it did not further elaborate on the scope of that authority.  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 
635 (2006). 
 235. See, e.g., Al Alwi v. Obama, 653 F.3d 11, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Hatim v. Gates, 632 F.3d 
720, 721 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 236. See Salahi v. Obama, 625 F.3d 745, 750, 753 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (reversing and remanding 
grant of habeas petition for further fact-finding; assuming, without discussing, that a petitioner 
could be militarily detained as “part of” al Qaeda even if he lacked connection to the armed 
conflict in Afghanistan). 
 237. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533, 537–38 (plurality opinion) (holding that the military process 
provided to petitioner fails to satisfy the Due Process Clause’s requirement of adequate notice and 
a meaningful opportunity to be heard before a neutral decision-maker). 
 238. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 792, 798 (holding that review of Combatant Status Review 
Tribunal determinations under the restrictive standards of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 
does not provide an adequate and effective substitute for habeas corpus). 
 239. Id. at 744–45; Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509. 
 240. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 783–85 (suggesting, by reference to the CSRT’s 
shortcomings, what an adequate fact-finding process would require in cases of executive 
detention); Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 537–38 (noting that a properly constituted military tribunal could 
provide an adequate fact-finding process for individuals seized on the battlefield during armed 
conflict).  The Suspension Clause would additionally require collateral review through habeas to 
correct errors in that process.  Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 786.  The scope and intensity of that 
habeas review would depend in part on the robustness of that underlying process.  Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2012] RECONCEPTUALIZING FEDERAL COURTS IN THE WAR ON TERROR 1089 
(Boumediene) required judicial fact-finding to remedy the flaws.241  In Hamdi, 
the Court’s ruling meant that the petitioner was entitled to a judicial 
determination of whether he fell within the enemy combatant category, as 
defined by the Court in that case;242 in Boumediene, it meant that the 
petitioners and all other Guantánamo detainees were entitled to a judicial 
determination of whether there was a lawful basis to hold them.243  Moreover, 
the Boumediene Court ruled that judicial determination had to allow for 
independent fact-finding in order to satisfy the Suspension Clause.244  While 
Hamdi and Boumediene said that the judicial review must be meaningful, they 
also instructed lower courts to take into account the government’s legitimate 
security interests in establishing a framework for review of individual detainee 
cases.245  Ultimately, the Court left it to lower courts to resolve the various 
evidentiary and procedural issues presented by the habeas litigation in the first 
instance.246 
Hamdan involved a similar exercise of judicial review, only there the 
Court examined the legality of trying detainees in military commissions rather 
than holding them in law-of-war detention.247  Hamdan invalidated the military 
commissions created by President Bush because they failed to conform to the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”) 248 and, by incorporation, 
 
 241. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 785 (“[W]e agree with petitioners that, even when all the 
parties involved in this process act with diligence and in good faith, there is considerable risk of 
error in the tribunal’s findings of fact . . . [which] is a risk too significant to ignore.”); Hamdi, 542 
U.S. at 537–38. 
 242. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533. 
 243. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 779. 
 244. Id. at 732, 788–89 (finding that federal appellate review of military CSRT 
determinations under the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 does not provide an “adequate and 
effective” substitute for habeas review because, inter alia, the appeals court cannot consider new 
evidence produced by the detainee). 
 245. See id. at 796 (“We make no attempt to anticipate all of the evidentiary and access-to-
counsel issues that will arise during the course of the detainees’ habeas corpus proceedings.  We 
recognize, however, that the Government has a legitimate interest in protecting sources and 
methods of intelligence gathering; and we expect that the District Court will use its discretion to 
accommodate this interest to the greatest extent possible.”); Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533–34 
(explaining that “enemy-combatant proceedings may be tailored to alleviate their uncommon 
potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict” and noting, for example, 
that “[h]earsay . . . may need to be accepted as the most reliable available evidence from the 
Government in such a proceeding” and that “the Constitution would not be offended by a 
presumption in favor of the Government’s evidence, so long as that presumption remained a 
rebuttable one and fair opportunity for rebuttal were provided”). 
 246. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 796 (leaving various “evidentiary and access-to-counsel” issues 
to the “expertise and competence” of the district courts to address in the first instance). 
 247. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567 (2006), superseded by statute, Military 
Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600. 
 248. Id. at 567. 
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Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which the Court held applied to 
all prisoners detained in connection with the armed conflict against al Qaeda (a 
conflict whose scope the Court declined to define with any precision).249  The 
Court’s decision had three principal effects on U.S. national security policy.  
First, it enforced a statutorily based requirement of conformity between 
military commissions and courts-martial, which in turn required conformity 
with the law of war.250  Second, Hamdan mandated baseline protections for the 
treatment of all prisoners in U.S. custody in the war on terror by rejecting the 
administration’s contention that enemy combatants fell outside the ambit of 
Common Article 3.251  Third, the decision, which was grounded in the 
executive’s failure to adhere to congressional requirements, invited subsequent 
legislative action in the field.252  “Nothing,” as Justice Breyer explained in his 
concurrence, “prevents the President from returning to Congress to seek the 
authority he believes necessary.”253 
Congress would take up this invitation twice—authorizing military 
commissions four months after Hamdan in the Military Commissions Act 
(“MCA”) of 2006254 and then further modifying the commissions three years 
later.255  Created in the shadow of Hamdan, these new commissions would 
contain procedural safeguards that earlier commissions lacked, including 
greater opportunities for defendants to confront the evidence against them and 
stricter protections against the use of evidence obtained through coercion.256  
The 2009 revisions, moreover, eliminated a provision precluding defendants 
from challenging the commissions for failing to comply with Common Article 
3.257  The new commissions did not, however, resolve concerns surrounding 
 
 249. Id. at 630, 631 & n.63, 635. 
 250. Id. at 613. 
 251. Id. at 630–32. 
 252. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 567 (noting the military commission lacked power to proceed 
because it violated the UCMJ as passed by Congress). 
 253. Id. at 636 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 254. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 948b, 120 Stat. 2600, 2602 
(codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948b). 
 255. Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, tit. XVIII, 123 Stat. 2190, 
2574–2614 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a–950t (2010)). 
 256. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 948q(b)–948r, 949j (Supp. III 2010). 
 257. See Deborah N. Pearlstein, Ratcheting Back: International Law as a Constraint on 
Executive Power, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 523, 533 (2010) (noting that while the 2006 MCA 
“could be read to prevent commission defendants from invoking Geneva as any ‘source of rights,’ 
even in defense against a criminal action against them, [the 2009 MCA] appeared to prevent 
defendants only from relying on Geneva to create a separate cause of action in federal court,” thus 
enabling them to claim Geneva’s continued availability as applicable law in their commission 
case). 
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the admission of hearsay evidence,258 nor did it significantly alter the 
government’s substantive power to try noncitizens in commissions, including 
for offenses like material support for terrorism259 that are generally not 
recognized as war crimes under international law.260 
These three decisions suggest the potential role of federal courts in 
influencing U.S. detention policy in the war on terror.  As a general matter, the 
Court found that at least some military counterterrorism detentions are a proper 
subject for judicial review, even if they arise in connection with an armed 
conflict and notwithstanding the government’s warnings about interference 
with core executive functions.  Hamdi and Boumediene demonstrate the 
Court’s willingness to impose constitutionally based process requirements, 
whether through the Due Process Clause or the Suspension Clause, to provide 
detainees with an opportunity to challenge the allegations against them in a 
judicial forum.  Hamdan’s holding on the applicability of Common Article 3 to 
the armed conflict with al Qaeda and associated forces—with its prohibition 
not only on torture but also on lesser forms of mistreatment261—reflects the 
Court’s willingness to impose baseline standards for the treatment of detainees 
and its aversion to a legal vacuum. 
The decisions, however, also demonstrate judicial hesitation in reviewing 
substantive detention standards.262  Although the Court has made clear that the 
permissible scope of the “enemy combatant” category is a judicial question, it 
has shown no great enthusiasm for answering it, whether by crafting a narrow 
holding in Hamdi,263 declining to address the question in Boumediene,264 or 
 
 258. David Glazier, Playing by the Rules: Combating al Qaeda Within the Law of War, 51 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 957, 1033 (2009) (cautioning that “the continued admissibility of hearsay 
creates real concern that the government might circumvent MCA 2009’s prohibitions on 
admission of evidence obtained by torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment”). 
 259. 10 U.S.C. § 950t(25). 
 260. See David Weissbrodt & Andrea W. Templeton, Fair Trials? The Manual for Military 
Commissions in Light of Common Article 3 and Other International Law, 26 LAW & INEQ. 353, 
362 n.48, 364 (2008). 
 261. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
 262. See Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror”, 108 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1013, 1015–16, 1028 (2008) (criticizing the Court’s extensive focus on procedural questions 
at the expense of addressing larger substantive questions surrounding the scope of the executive’s 
detention authority); see also Stephen I. Vladeck, The Passive-Aggressive Virtues, 111 COLUM. 
L. REV. SIDEBAR 122, 125 (2011) (describing the Court’s failure to review the substantive 
detention standard applied in the Guantanamo habeas cases). 
 263. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509, 522 n.1 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
 264. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 798 (2008).  Several petitioners in Boumediene had 
pressed the issue of the permissible scope of AUMF-based detention.  See Brief for the 
Boumediene Petitioners at 33–43, Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (No. 06-1195), 2007 
WL 2441590 at *33–43. 
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allowing the government to moot the habeas challenges in Padilla v. Hanft265 
and al-Marri v. Pucciarelli.266  In Padilla and al-Marri, the government 
avoided a Supreme Court determination on the outer reaches of the President’s 
military detention power by bringing criminal charges against the petitioners 
and returning them to civilian custody after years of military detention.267  
Additionally, apart from its process-based rulings in Hamdi and Boumediene, 
which looked to constitutional norms in mandating judicial review of 
executive-branch assessments about detainees, the Court rested its decisions on 
statutory grounds.  Thus, while Hamdan noted the constitutional limits of the 
executive’s authority to create military commissions that contravened existing 
legislation,268 it did not question Congress’s authority to create new military 
commissions nor did it establish any constitutional constraints on that 
authority.269  The Court’s Suspension Clause holding in Boumediene, 
moreover, occurred only after the Court had previously attempted to address its 
concerns about unreviewable executive detention in Rasul v. Bush through 
statutory interpretation,270 and subsequent congressional court-stripping 
legislation left no alternative except to ground the right to judicial review in the 
Constitution.271 
Since Boumediene, lower courts have addressed various questions that the 
Supreme Court left open in the course of exercising their habeas jurisdiction 
 
 265. See Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062, 1063 (2006). 
 266. 534 F.3d 213, 216 (4th Cir. 2008), vacated as moot sub nom. al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. 
Ct. 1545 (2009). 
 267. See al-Marri, 129 S. Ct. at 1545; Padilla, 547 U.S. at 1063; Padilla, 547 U.S. at 1064 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  In Padilla and al-Marri, the Bush Administration claimed the legal 
authority to seize suspected terrorists arrested in the United States and detain them indefinitely as 
enemy combatants as part of the global armed conflict against al Qaeda.  Padilla, 547 U.S. at 
1062 (majority opinion); id. at 1064 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); al-Marri, 534 F.3d at 217 (Motz, 
J., concurring).  In Padilla, this power was applied to a U.S. citizen.  Padilla, 547 U.S. at 1062 
(majority opinion).  In al-Marri, to a noncitizen who had lawfully entered the country.  Al-Marri, 
534 F.3d at 219. 
 268. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 593 n.23 (2006) (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)) (“Whether or not the President 
has independent power, absent congressional authorization, to convene military commissions, he 
may not disregard limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of its own war powers, placed 
on his powers.”), superseded by statute, Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 
120 Stat. 2600. 
 269. See id. at 594–95. 
 270. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 477–78, 484 (2004) (holding that Guantánamo detainees 
have a right to challenge their detention under the federal habeas corpus statute, but declining to 
decide whether the detainees have a constitutionally protected right to habeas corpus under the 
Suspension Clause). 
 271. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732–33 (2008) (finding that section seven of the 
Military Commissions Act of 2006 was an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas 
corpus). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2012] RECONCEPTUALIZING FEDERAL COURTS IN THE WAR ON TERROR 1093 
and resolving individual Guantánamo detainee petitions.  Together, the D.C. 
Circuit and district courts have thus far decided approximately eighty 
Guantánamo detainee cases.272  In determining whether a particular petitioner’s 
detention is lawful, these courts have addressed various questions affecting 
U.S. detention practices, including the standard under which individuals may 
be confined pursuant to the AUMF,273 the evidentiary rules governing the 
habeas review process,274 and the remedy available to those petitioners whose 
detention has been found unlawful.275  The results of this lower court habeas 
litigation reveal a marked shift over time: in the first nineteen months after 
Boumediene, district courts granted thirty-three of the forty-four habeas 
petitions they decided;276 since then, the D.C. Circuit has decided sixteen 
appeals ruling for the government in all except two cases.277  Since the D.C. 
Circuit began reviewing district habeas decisions and articulating rules that 
make it more difficult for a detainee to prevail, district courts have increasingly 
ruled in the government’s favor—a trend that has accelerated sharply with the 
number of D.C. Circuit decisions.278 
The D.C. Circuit has upheld a more expansive AUMF-based detention 
standard than either the Supreme Court applied in Hamdi279 or the district 
 
 272. See Jonathan Hafetz, Calling the Government to Account: Habeas Corpus After 
Boumediene, 56 WAYNE L. REV. (forthcoming 2012).  District courts have issued merits 
decisions in sixty-three Guantánamo habeas cases, and the D.C. Circuit has decided sixteen 
appeals from these cases.  See id.; see also Stephen I. Vladeck, The D.C. Circuit After 
Boumediene, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 1451, 1453–54 (2011) (noting the deep divide these cases 
have caused between the D.C. Circuit and D.C. District Courts). 
 273. See Vladeck, supra note 272, at 1456–65. 
 274. See id. at 1466, 1469–73. 
 275. See id. at 1476–88. 
 276. See Marc D. Falkoff & Robert Knowles, Bagram, Boumediene, and Limited 
Government, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 851, 853 n.8, 861 (2010). 
 277. Hafetz, supra note 272.  In those two cases, the D.C. Circuit reversed a habeas denial 
and remanded for further proceedings.  Id.  For the remaining cases, the breakdown is as follows: 
in eight cases, the appeals court affirmed a habeas denial; in three cases, it reversed a habeas grant 
and directed judgment for the government; and in three cases it vacated a habeas grant and 
remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings.  Hafetz, supra note 272; E-mail 
from Brian Foster to author (Oct. 14, 2011, 17:08) (on file with author). 
 278. Since July 2010, for example, district judges have not granted any Guantánamo habeas 
petitions, while denying ten petitions—yet twenty-two habeas petitions were granted, with only 
fifteen denied in the two previous years.  Editorial, Reneging on Justice at Guantánamo, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 20, 2011, at SR 10; see also MARK DENBEAUX & JONATHAN HAFETZ, SETON HALL 
LAW CTR. FOR POLICY & RESEARCH, NO HEARING HABEAS: D.C. CIRCUIT RESTRICTS 
MEANINGFUL REVIEW 1, 6 (2012) (describing the impact of D.C. Circuit decisions on district 
court fact-finding in Guantánamo habeas cases and tracking the increasing rate of acceptance of 
by district judges of the government’s allegations), available at http://law.shu.edu/ProgramsCen 
ters/PublicIntGovServ/policyresearch/upload/no-hearing-habeas.pdf. 
 279. See supra notes 229–33 and accompanying text. 
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courts recognized in post-Boumediene Guantánamo detainee habeas cases.280  
The appeals court has ruled that individuals may be held in military detention 
if they were part of al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces or purposefully 
and materially supported such forces in hostilities against the United States or 
its allies.281  In applying this standard, the Circuit has rejected any rigid test, 
such as one that would require the government to show that detainees received 
and executed orders as part of the enemy organization’s “command structure,” 
in favor of a more flexible, case-by-case approach.282  It has not required that 
the petitioner was on a battlefield or directly participated in hostilities.283  
While most of the Guantánamo habeas cases involve detainees apprehended in 
connection with the armed conflict in Afghanistan, the D.C. Circuit has not 
placed any geographic limit on the government’s military detention power or 
otherwise suggested that the conflict itself is territorially limited.284 
The D.C. Circuit has also upheld the use of hearsay evidence285 and 
rejected efforts by detainees to invoke rights under the Constitution’s 
Confrontation Clause.286  Most significantly, the D.C. Circuit has required 
district courts to take a highly deferential approach to the government’s 
evidence.  It has repeatedly criticized district judges for failing to view the 
government’s evidence in its totality and focusing instead on specific 
weaknesses in its case.287  Some D.C. Circuit judges have suggested that the 
government’s evidence in Guantánamo detainee habeas cases should be 
subjected merely to a “some evidence” test, rather than to the more rigorous 
 
 280. See Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 68–69 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3) (focusing 
on whether an individual “‘receive[s] and execute[s] orders’ from [the enemy organization’s] 
‘command structure’” in determining whether that individual is “part of” al Qaeda and thus 
detainable under the AUMF), abrogated by Uthman v. Obama, 637 F.3d 400 (D.C. Cir. 2011); 
see also Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 75 (D.D.C. 2009) (applying a similar “command 
structure” test), abrogated by Uthman v. Obama, 637 F.3d 400 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 281. See, e.g., Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 872 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 282. Uthman, 637 F.3d at 400, 403. 
 283. See, e.g., Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 869, 873. 
 284. Salahi v. Obama, 625 F.3d 745, 750–51 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (concluding that the AUMF 
would authorize the detention of an individual seized in Mauritania and who was not alleged to 
have taken part in the current armed conflict in Afghanistan because the relevant inquiry was 
whether the defendant was “part of” al-Qaida when captured). 
 285. E.g., Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (ruling that hearsay is always 
admissible in detainee habeas cases and that the operative question is what weight to give it); Al-
Bihani, 590 F.3d at 879. 
 286. Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 879 (ruling that the rights protected under the Sixth Amendment’s 
Confrontation Clause apply only to criminal trials). 
 287. See, e.g., Salahi, 625 F.3d at 753 (criticizing the district judge for taking an “unduly 
atomized” view of the government’s evidence); Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1105–06 
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (same). 
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preponderance of the evidence standard that the government itself has 
advocated.288  The Circuit has further ruled that district judges must presume 
the accuracy of government intelligence reports unless rebutted by the 
petitioner,289 causing the dissenting judge to note that the ruling “comes 
perilously close to suggesting that whatever the government says must be 
treated as true.”290  With such a ruling, the dissent explained, “it is hard to see 
what is left of the Supreme Court’s command in Boumediene that habeas 
review be ‘meaningful.’”291  Additionally, the D.C. Circuit has held that 
district courts have no authority to order the release of a prisoner into the 
United States—even if the prisoner prevails on his habeas petition but cannot 
be safely returned to his home country or repatriated to a third country.292 
These post-Boumediene lower court decisions provide an additional 
perspective on federal court review of post-9/11 detention cases.  In evaluating 
the lawfulness of an individual petitioner’s law-of-war-based confinement, 
they have served as de facto national security detention courts.  Through a 
common law process of adjudication, they have developed substantive and 
procedural rules for a new form of executive confinement based on an 
individual’s participation in, support for, or connection to a global armed 
conflict with al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist groups.293  (Congress recently 
 
 288. See Esmail v. Obama, 639 F.3d 1075, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Silberman, J., concurring) 
(advocating the adoption of a more deferential approach to the government’s evidence); see also 
Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 878 & n.4.  The D.C. Circuit has rejected arguments by detainees that the 
Constitution requires a more rigorous standard than preponderance of the evidence.  Id. at 878. 
 289. Latif v. Obama, 666 F.3d 746, 748–49 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 290. Id. at 779 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (quoting Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 849 (D.C. Cir. 
2008)). 
 291. Id. 
 292. See Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (finding that district 
courts have no authority to order the release of a prisoner, whose habeas petition was successful, 
into the United States); see also Kiyemba v. Obama, 605 F.3d 1046, 1047–48 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(upholding continued indefinite detention of prisoners under such circumstances).  The Court had 
previously granted certiorari to determine “whether a federal court exercising habeas jurisdiction 
has the power to order the release of” a Guantánamo detainee into the United States, where such 
release is the only effective remedy.  See Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1235, 1235 (2010).  
Before the case was argued, however, the U.S. government had obtained offers of resettlement for 
all of the Kiyemba petitioners.  Id.  The Court, accordingly, vacated the D.C. Circuit’s opinion 
holding that federal courts had no power to order release, Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 
1028 (D.C. Cir. 2009), and remanded to the appeals court to reconsider the case in light of these 
new facts.  Kiyemba, 130 S. Ct. at 1235.  The D.C. Circuit subsequently reinstated its prior 
determination that federal courts have no power to order a Guantanamo detainee’s release into the 
United States under any circumstance.  Kiyemba, 605 F.3d at 1048.  This time, the Court denied 
certiorari.  Kiyemba v. Obama, 131 S. Ct. 1631, 1631 (2011). 
 293. See supra notes 273–92 and accompanying text.  See Baher Azmy, Executive Detention, 
Boumediene, and the New Common Law of Habeas, 95 IOWA L. REV. 445, 505 (2010) 
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ratified the D.C. Circuit’s broad construction of the President’s detention 
power under the AUMF, expressly authorizing the detention of individuals 
who were part of or substantially supported al Qaeda, the Taliban, or 
associated forces).294  Detentions remain subject to judicial review via habeas 
corpus under Boumediene.295  But they are examined under standards and 
procedures that provide substantial latitude and a heightened degree of 
deference to the government.296  Boumediene, like Hamdi, may extol federal 
courts as providing an important checking function by protecting “the rights of 
the detained by affirming the duty and authority of the Judiciary to call the 
jailer to account.”297  The post-Boumediene litigation, however, has 
significantly cabined that review function and rendered it of little practical 
effect. 
Two other considerations are relevant to understanding federal-court 
review of post-9/11 detentions.  First, not all national security detentions are 
subject to judicial review.  The current statutory framework does not expressly 
provide for habeas jurisdiction over overseas detentions, while explicitly 
barring the exercise of that jurisdiction over noncitizens detained as enemy 
combatants.298  Under Boumediene, the availability of habeas jurisdiction 
under the Suspension Clause for overseas detentions is determined by a 
functional test that examines “(1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and 
the adequacy of the process through which that status determination was made; 
(2) the nature of the sites where apprehension and then detention took place; 
and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s entitlement 
to the writ.”299  The application of this test may have compelled habeas 
jurisdiction over detentions at Guantánamo, but it has not led to habeas review 
over detentions at Bagram, where the D.C. Circuit has deemed the Suspension 
Clause not to extend.300  Thus, even as Boumediene establishes the potential 
for federal courts’ review of overseas counterterrorism detentions by rejecting 
any categorical bars to jurisdiction based on a prisoner’s citizenship or 
 
(recognizing the expanded definition of “enemy combatant” to any individual who was part of or 
supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces). 
 294. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No 112-81, § 1021, 
125 Stat. 1298, 1562 (2011).  The D.C. Circuit had previously held that the AUMF authorized the 
military detention of individuals who were part of al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces or 
purposefully and materially supported such forces in hostilities against the United States or its 
allies.  See supra note 281 and accompanying text. 
 295. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 786–87 (2008). 
 296. See supra notes 285–90 and accompanying text. 
 297. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 745. 
 298. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006). 
 299. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766. 
 300. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 98 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (applying Boumediene and 
finding that the Suspension Clause does not apply to U.S. detentions at Bagram). 
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location,301 it allows for continued extrajudicial detention, depending on how 
its multi-factored test is applied. 
Boumediene, moreover, does not address proxy detention, where actual 
U.S. direction and control is masked by a foreign sovereign’s nominal exercise 
of custody over a prisoner.302  Although one district court has held that habeas 
jurisdiction can be asserted over proxy detentions on a theory of constructive 
custody,303 establishing the factual basis for such custody is difficult given the 
potentially secret and fluid nature of the custodial arrangements.  Whether 
there is any federal court review of constructive custody cases thus depends 
largely on a judge’s willingness to allow jurisdictional discovery to flesh out 
those custodial arrangements in the face of government objections that such 
discovery will “interfere with the internal affairs of another sovereign nation 
and encroach on sensitive foreign policy concerns.”304 
Second, not all claims are subject to judicial review even where habeas 
jurisdiction exists, as the post-Boumediene Guantánamo detainee litigation 
shows.305  The D.C. Circuit has held that judges cannot review the executive’s 
decision to transfer a prisoner to another country, even where that prisoner 
claims it would result in their likely torture or continued imprisonment.306  It 
has also denied habeas review when sought by former Guantánamo detainees 
based on the collateral consequences flowing from their prior—and still 
unrescinded— designation as enemy combatants.307  Thus, to the extent 
Boumediene creates a role for federal courts as national security detention 
courts—to review counterterrorism detentions outside the criminal justice 
system—that role has been confined to a limited category of detentions as well 
as a limited scope of claims. 
As a result of the Guantánamo habeas corpus litigation, courts have helped 
shape the broader rules governing war on terrorism detentions and 
prosecutions as well as evaluated the merits of individual detainee cases.  In its 
trio of “enemy combatant” decisions—Hamdi, Hamdan, and Boumediene—the 
Supreme Court created the possibility of judicial oversight by rejecting strict 
 
 301. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 747, 771. 
 302. Robert M. Chesney, Who May Be Held?  Military Detention Through the Habeas Lens, 
52 B.C. L. REV. 769, 850 n.601 (2011). 
 303. Abu Ali v. Ashcroft, 350 F. Supp. 2d 28, 68 (D.D.C. 2004) (holding that habeas 
jurisdiction would lie over a U.S. citizen detained abroad by a foreign government if the United 
States actually exercised custody or control over the detention). 
 304. HAFETZ, supra note 17, at 197–98. 
 305. See Al-Zahrani v. Rumsfeld, 684 F. Supp. 2d 103, 110 (D.D.C. 2010). 
 306. Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba II), 561 F.3d 509, 514 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 307. Gul v. Obama, 652 F.3d 12, 14, 17–18 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (affirming the dismissal of 
habeas petitions by former Guantánamo detainees challenging their unrescinded designation as 
enemy combatants and holding that the collateral consequences of that designation did not satisfy 
justiciability requirements under Article III). 
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territorial limits on the Constitution’s application; enforced separation of 
powers principles by requiring legislative authorization for military 
commissions; rejected the notion that war-on-terrorism detentions are exempt 
from international norms; and mandated individualized judicial review of 
Guantánamo detainee habeas cases.308 
Guantánamo thus can no longer be described as a legal black hole: 
detainees there have access to the courts through habeas corpus—however 
limited the habeas right may be—and substantive protections under Common 
Article 3.  Further, just as Suspension Clause-mandated habeas review has 
provided greater legitimacy to AUMF-based detentions, post-Hamdan 
congressional reforms to military commissions have enhanced their viability as 
an alternative to federal criminal prosecution through a process of 
legalization.309  Guantánamo, in short, has become a competing model to 
federal criminal prosecution for the long-term incapacitation of terrorism 
suspects—a model whose more limited procedural protections and laxer 
evidentiary standards, its supporters argue, are justified by the government’s 
need to protect intelligence sources and methods, the dangers of interfering 
with military operations, and the limited competence of the judiciary in matters 
affecting national security.  If the post-9/11 habeas litigation suggests the 
resilience of judicial review, it also accepts a judicial role that is less public, 
less protective of individual rights, and less willing to scrutinize the 
government’s evidence than terrorism prosecutions in Article III courts. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In Representing Justice, Professors Resnik and Curtis remind us of the 
importance of contextualizing the post-9/11 shift towards military tribunals 
within a larger, decades-long transformation of courts in the United States.310  
Focusing only on apparent change, they note, obscures continuities, including 
how the United States relies increasingly on non-Article III forums and 
alternative dispute mechanisms to resolve controversies.311  This Article argues 
that this increased reliance on alternative methods of adjudication, in turn, 
affects the perception and operation of Article III courts.  In particular, the 
Article demonstrates how the creation of an alternative military detention 
system after 9/11 has transformed federal courts, reshaping their role as forums 
for criminal prosecutions and civil damages actions, while creating a new 
species of federal adjudication in which courts hear challenges to detentions 
under this alternative system. 
 
 308. See supra notes 226–53 and accompanying text. 
 309. See RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 1, at 327–28. 
 310. Id. at 334–35. 
 311. Id. at 335. 
